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Holistic Pregnancy: Rejecting the
Theory of the Adversarial Mother
Rona Kaufman Kitchen*
INTRODUCTION
Like generations of mothers before her, Laura Pemberton planned to
welcome her baby into the world in the comfort of her family home. She
desired a natural, vaginal birth. The State disagreed. Police entered her
home, strapped her legs together and forcibly transported her to the
hospital. Authorized by court order, doctors cut her open and removed her
baby from her womb, without her consent.1
Angela Carder had an inoperable, terminal, cancerous tumor in her lung.
She was twenty-five weeks pregnant and eagerly awaiting the birth of her
first child when the tumor was found. Wanting to deliver a healthy baby and
live long enough to hold him in her arms, she consented to undergo a
cesarean section once her pregnancy reached twenty-eight weeks. Angela’s
health rapidly deteriorated and at twenty-six weeks, without her consent, but
armed with a court order, doctors cut her open and removed her baby from
her womb, ending the lives of both baby and mother.2

*Assistant Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. This Article
represents conversations I have been having in my head since I first experienced pregnancy
in 2002. It also incorporates the thoughts and feedback I received from my supportive
colleagues: Martha Jordan, Bruce Ledewitz, Jan Levine, Jane Moriarty, Wesley Oliver,
Nancy Perkins, Laurie Serafino, and Ann Schiavone. I thank Dr. J. Lee Nelson and
Professor Jeanne Flavin for their helpful critique. I am grateful for the opportunity to
present earlier versions of this article at the Three School Colloquium at the University of
Pittsburgh School of Law and the Feminist Law Conferences organized by Marina Angel at
Temple University Beasley School of Law and the University of Pennsylvania School of
Law. I thank the following students for their valuable research assistance: Alexandra Bott,
Staci Fonner, Judy Hale Reed, and Cara Pinto. And, I thank the staff of the Hastings
Women’s Law Journal, especially Sonya Laddon Rahders, for their suggestions and edits.
Finally, I am thankful beyond words to my grandmother, mother, sister, and children for
helping me to understand the nature of pregnancy and the mother-child relationship.
1. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D.
Fla. 1999); Lynne M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on
Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status
and Public Health, 38(2) J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL’Y & L. 299, 306–07 (2013); Sarah D.
Murphy, Labor Pains in Feminist Jurisprudence: An Examination of Birthing Rights, note,
8 AVE MARIA L. REV. 443, 443–44 (2010).
2. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
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Bei Bei Shuai attempted to commit suicide after her boyfriend, a married
man who was the father of the child she was expecting, left her. She
survived, but her baby did not. Thereafter, she was charged with murder.3
Rennie Gibbs, a pregnant fifteen-year-old girl ingested cocaine during her
pregnancy. She delivered a premature stillborn with the umbilical cord
wrapped around its neck. The teen was charged with “depraved heart murder.”4
Hope Ankrom’s healthy newborn tested positive for cocaine. Despite
her denial of drug use and the lack of harm to her baby, Hope was arrested.
Police separated her from all three of her children, including her
breastfeeding newborn. She was convicted of child endangerment and
sentenced to three years in prison.5
These stories exemplify the law’s hostile relationship with pregnant
women. Rather than presuming the pregnant woman will act in the best
interests of her pregnancy and of fetal life, the law assumes that she is
hostile to her unborn child and identifies the State as better suited to protect
pregnancy and fetal life. The law responds to pregnant women as if they
are threats to their babies, instead of respecting them as expectant mothers.
As a result, pregnant women are increasingly targeted by the State for
aggressive surveillance, regulation, separation, and incarceration. Outside
of the abortion context, the assumption that a pregnant woman is hostile to
her fetus is misplaced and leads to disastrous results for women, children,
and families. Pregnant women eagerly anticipating the births of their
children like Laura Pemberton and Angela Carder are brutally assaulted by
the State in the name of fetal protection. Mothers like Hope Ankrom are
taken from their children for the sake of punishing misconduct during
pregnancy. Young women like Rennie Gibbs and Bei Bei Shuai are revictimized by the State after suffering the devastating loss of their babies.
In addition to affecting those directly involved, this intervention also
fosters an environment in which pregnant women fear the State. The
State’s interaction with pregnant women, outside of the abortion context,
communicates that women’s autonomy, bodily integrity, parental rights,
and physical freedom are at risk during pregnancy. Birthing plans are
subject to veto by the State. Prenatal indiscretions are subject to harsh
judgment. Misconduct stemming from mental illness and drug addiction is
more likely to lead to criminal charges and lengthy incarcerations. As
Lynn Paltrow, Jeanne Flavin, and the National Advocates for Pregnant
Women have documented, women, aware of the trend toward increased
state involvement, consider that their rights will be constrained if they
become pregnant.6 Thus, the impact of the State’s relationship with
3. Bei Bei Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
4. Order 162566, Gibbs v. State, 2010-IA-00819-SCT, (Miss. Oct. 27, 2011).
5. Ex parte Ankrom v. State, 152 So. 3d 397 (Ala. 2013); see Ada Calhoun, The
Criminalization of Bad Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/04/29/magazine/the-criminalization-of-bad-mothers.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
6. See Lynn M. Paltrow and Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant
Women in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public
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pregnancy is not limited to those women whose individual rights have been
affected. State action against any pregnant woman serves as a warning to
all women who are pregnant or who may become pregnant.7
This invasive state action is a consequence of extending the legal
understanding of pregnancy as developed in the abortion cases, which has
various flaws, to all pregnancies.8 The law first conceptualized pregnancy as
adversarial in response to women’s attempts to terminate pregnancy. In the
abortion context, understanding the relationship between mother and fetus as
adversarial is arguably essential to protection of fetal life. By identifying the
mother as a threat to the fetus, State intervention is justified. Therefore,
within the abortion context, it is easy to understand why pregnancy was
defined as inherently adversarial. The great tragedy is that this adversarial
view is becoming the dominant legal paradigm for all pregnancies. Wanted
and unwanted pregnancies alike are being treated as threatened pregnancies.
Pregnant women intending to carry their pregnancies to term and love a new
child are viewed with suspicion for the harm they could inflict, instead of
with respect and appreciation for the care they will provide. This article
critiques this perspective. It argues that the adversarial conceptualization of
pregnancy is inapplicable outside of the abortion context. In other words,
wanted pregnancies9 should not be conceptualized as adversarial and State
action should not be justified upon that basis.

Health, 38(2) J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL’Y & L. 299, 330–31 (2013) (discussing examples of
pregnant women who avoid prenatal care out of fear of arrest, or who would have avoided
prenatal care or lied to their healthcare providers had they known there was a risk of arrest).
7. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 51 (1995) (“[R]egardless of the differences among us,
all women must care about social and legal constructions of motherhood. Although we may
make individual choices not to become mothers, social construction and its legal ramifications
operate independent of individual choice. As is demonstrated in everyday existence, as well as
in legal doctrines and political language, women will be treated as mothers (or potential
mothers) because ‘Woman’ as a cultural and legal category inevitably encompasses and
incorporates socially constructed notions of motherhood in its definition.”).
8. In this article I do not critique the legal conceptualization of pregnancy in the
abortion context because this article is not a critique of the adversarial conceptualization of
pregnancy in the context of abortion. Rather, this article is about the law’s application of
the adversarial view of pregnancy to pregnancies that are not being terminated, that is,
wanted pregnancies. Therefore, most of the discussions of pregnant women in this article
refer to pregnant women who intend to carry their pregnancies to term.
9. In this article, my discussion of “wanted pregnancies” is meant to refer to all
pregnancies wherein the pregnant woman intends to carry the pregnancy to term and give
birth to a child. Calling all such pregnancies “wanted” may seem misleading because it
does not distinguish between unintended and intended pregnancies. Also, it does not
distinguish between pregnancies that are intended to birth a baby that the mother will keep
as opposed to a baby the mother will give up for adoption or through a surrogacy
arrangement. Nevertheless, I use the phrase “wanted pregnancies” to prefer to all
pregnancies intended to be carried to term because there does not seem to be a better phrase
to describe such pregnancies. Under this description, the only pregnancies that are not
“wanted pregnancies” are those that that the pregnant woman plans to terminate.
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A better baseline view of pregnancy will reflect the nature of
pregnancy by incorporating the physiological, existential, and social
aspects of pregnancy and recognizing its simultaneous duality and oneness.
It will recognize that pregnancy is inherently nonadversarial and in all
cases of wanted pregnancies, the woman should be presumed to act in the
best interests of herself, her pregnancy, and her fetus.
The pregnancy paradigm that I propose is rooted in a holistic view of
pregnancy. A holistic view reflects scientific knowledge and maternal
experience to incorporate all aspects of pregnancy. It conceptualizes
pregnancy by building upon scientific understandings of the fetal-maternal
relationship and maternal accounts of the experience of pregnancy. At its
core, it seeks to replace the law’s patriarchal construction of pregnancy as
inherently adversarial, with a view of pregnancy that is consistent with the
true nature of the mother-child dyad. This article argues that the view of
pregnancy as adversarial is generally inapplicable to wanted pregnancies.
Moreover, this article asserts that the adoption of a conceptualization of
pregnancy consistent with scientific knowledge and maternal experience
will lead to greater protection of both maternal and fetal interests.
This article consists of four parts. In Part I, I discuss the legal
evolution of the adversarial conceptualization of pregnancy. Tracking
cases in tort and constitutional law, I demonstrate how the law’s adversarial
understanding of pregnancy developed. In Part II, I use interdisciplinary
motherhood research to refute the adversarial conceptualization of
pregnancy, and to establish that pregnancy is defined by physiological,
existential, and social duality and oneness. I present my holistic view of
pregnancy and situate it within the broader feminist legal discourse. In Part
III, I demonstrate the danger of applying the adversarial conceptualization
of pregnancy in the context of wanted pregnancies. I discuss cases that
exemplify application of the adversarial view to pregnancies that are
inherently un-adversarial, and the unjust consequences that result.

I. EVOLUTION OF THE LEGAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF
PREGNANCY
Modern pregnancy jurisprudence can be traced back to early tort cases.
The courts that first encountered questions concerning the nature of
pregnancy conceptualized it as wholly situated within the woman.10 I call
10. See infra section II.A., p. 229; Notably, the earliest cases addressing the rights of a
fetus involved whether a child could inherit property if born after the death of a testator. See
William J. Maledon, Note, Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical
Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 349, 352 (1971) (citing Biggs v. McCarty, 86 Ind.
352 (Ind. 1882) (determining that a child in utero at the time of the testator’s death had an
equal right and title to property with his mother where the testator devised land to the
mother “and her children”); Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. 255 (Mass. 1834) (finding that a
grandchild could share in a bequest under his grandfather’s will even though he was born
nine months after his grandfather’s death); Aubuchon v. Bender, 44 Mo. 560 (Mo. 1869)
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this view of pregnancy the connected view because it focuses on the
maternal-fetal connection and considers the fetus to be part of the mother.
By the 1950s, courts were rejecting the connected view of pregnancy in
favor of a conceptualization of pregnancy as the embodiment of a woman
and an independently existing fetus.11 I call this alternative view of
pregnancy the separate existence view, because it is based on the idea that
the fetus and the pregnant woman are separable and distinct. The separate
existence view of pregnancy eventually inspired the judicial
conceptualization of pregnancy in the abortion cases.12 In Roe v. Wade, the
separate existence understanding of pregnancy further evolved into an
understanding of pregnancy as the embodiment of two separable, distinct
beings with adversarial interests. I call this view the adversarial view.
According to the adversarial view, state intervention is needed to protect
fetal interests because the pregnant woman is in conflict with the fetus.
This adversarial view of pregnancy is quickly becoming the dominant
conceptualization of pregnancy in the law.13
Today, consistent with the adversarial view of pregnancy, pregnant
women’s healthcare decisions are often scrutinized and overruled by the
State, in the name of protecting potential life. When pregnant women
engage in undesirable conduct, criminal and dependency courts apply the
adversarial view to deny them access to their children and, in some cases,
(concluding that a child could inherit all types of estates and remainders in real property
from his father even though he was born after his father’s death).
11. See infra section II.B., p. 231.
12. See infra section II.C., p. 232.
13. This article deals with the legal conceptualization of pregnancy in medical
intervention, criminal, and dependency law. I argue that in these areas of law, the
adversarial view of pregnancy is quickly becoming the dominant legal conceptualization.
Other areas of law that consider pregnancy include family, surrogacy, immigration, and
employment. Though aspects of the adversarial conceptualization of pregnancy are present
among pregnancy conceptualizations in these other areas of law, they are not exclusively
guided by an adversarial view. In other articles I will discuss how the adversarial
conceptualization of pregnancy appears in family, surrogacy, immigration, and employment
law. The recently decided Supreme Court case Young v. UPS, Inc. may significantly shift
the conceptualization of pregnancy in employment law, with the court’s holding that a
pregnant employee may use non-pregnant employees as comparators to show improper
denial of accommodations. 575 U.S. ___ (2015). In Young, the Court considered how the
law should treat pregnant workers. It was argued that the accommodations provided under
the Americans with Disabilities Act to workers with disabilities who are similar to pregnant
workers in their ability or inability to perform certain tasks ought to serve as a baseline for
treating pregnant workers under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Brief of Law for
Professors and Women’s Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 28,
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 12-1226, (U.S. Sept. 10, 2014), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/239318619/Young-v-UPS-Supreme-Court-Brief. Additionally,
legal scholars argued that the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008
(“ADAAA”)’s expansion of the types of disabilities that require reasonable
accommodations, including those that limit a person’s ability to stand, lift, walk or bend,
should apply to pregnant workers under the PDA who have similar abilities or inabilities to
work. Id. at 29–30.
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to incarcerate them. In this section, I trace, analyze, and discuss the
evolution of the legal conceptualization of pregnancy and explain how the
courts came to adopt an adversarial understanding of pregnancy.
A. THE CONNECTED VIEW
In the late 1800s, State courts first considered the nature of pregnancy
in cases concerning in utero14 injuries to the fetus. In Dietrich v.
Inhabitants of Northampton, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., writing
for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, held a suit could not be
maintained by the deceased child of a woman who was injured when she
was four or five months pregnant and such injury “brought on a
miscarriage, and the child, although not directly injured, . . . was too little
advanced in [fetal] life to survive its premature birth.”15 Though the infant
died ten to fifteen minutes later, there was testimony that the child did live
following delivery.16 The issue addressed by the court was “whether an
infant dying before it was able to live separated from its mother could be
said to have become a person recognized by the law as capable of having a
locus standi17 in court, or of being represented there by an administrator.”18
In determining that no civil suit could be brought by the child, Justice
Holmes reasoned that “the unborn child was a part of the mother at the
time of the injury,” and therefore, was not a person within the meaning of
the law such that suit could be brought on his behalf.19 The court’s
conclusion on the nature of pregnancy and the mother-child relationship,
that the child is part of the mother during pregnancy, was a controversial
proposition that would eventually be abandoned.20 However, for decades it
remained the prevailing common law view of pregnancy and the maternalfetal relationship.21 Thus, in the early 1900s the legal conceptualization of
pregnancy reflected a view of the mother and fetus as inherently and
inseparably connected.

14. In utero is defined as “In the womb; during gestation or before birth.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 951 (10th ed. 2014).
15. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 14–15 (Mass. 1884)
(abrogated by Keyes v. Construction Service, Inc., 165 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1960)).
16. Id.
17. Locus standi is defined as “The right to bring an action or to be heard in a given
forum; STANDING.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1084 (10th ed. 2014).
18. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 16.
19. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
20. See infra section I.B., p. 214.
21. Allaire v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 56 N.E. 638 (Ill. 1900); Prescott v. Robinson, 74 N.H.
460 (1908) (allowing mother to recover damages related to her suffering as a result of
negligent infliction of prenatal injuries, but disallowing mother to recover damages for
child’s injuries after birth); Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co., 139 N.Y.S. 367 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1913); Gorman v. Budlong, 55 L.R.A. 118 (1901) (denying recovery for prenatal
injuries); Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 159 N.W. 916 (Wis. 1916).
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In 1900, an Illinois case followed the connected view and barred
recovery by the infant for injuries it sustained due to the hospital’s
negligence prior to the child’s birth.22 There, the pregnant mother
sustained significant injuries when the elevator carrying her and her unborn
child malfunctioned.23 In reasoning that the infant could not maintain an
action against the hospital for injuries sustained before his birth, the court
noted that a contrary holding could allow an infant to “maintain an action
against its own mother for injuries occasioned by the negligence of the
mother while pregnant with it,” a seemingly absurd result.24
Though the court followed Dietrich’s reasoning, barring recovery by
the infant, Justice Carroll Boggs’s dissent “vigorously and persuasively
challenged” the “proposition that an unborn child was part of his mother.”25
Boggs argued for recognition of the life of a fetus as “a life distinct from
that of its mother when it reaches the prenatal state of viability at which it
could survive if then separated from her.”26 Though Boggs’s separate
existence view would eventually prevail, for many years courts continued
to apply the connected view that a child is not a person, but is a part of his
mother, until birth.27
In 1928, an Alabama Court applying the connected view explained,
[t]his court has established a general line of demarcation between
the civil rights of the mother and child to be born. It is concurrent
with separate existence of the mother and child by the birth; and
parental injury before the birth is no basis for action in damages by
the child or its personal representative. The mother of an unborn
child may recover damages to her and it, in ventre sa mere, “if such
injury and damage is not too remote.”28
Thus, a fetus injured in the womb could not bring suit for damages.
Recovery for injury was only available to the mother, so long as the
injuries sustained by the fetus were not too remote to her. The separate
existence of mother and child was only recognized after the child was born.

22. Allaire, 56 N.E. at 638.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 640.
25. Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428, 430 (W. Va. 1971) (internal citations omitted).
26. Id. (internal citations omitted).
27. See Israel Lerner, Torts – Right of Parent to Recover for Prenatal Injuries Causing
Death of Child – Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949), 28 TEX. L. REV. 986,
987 (1950) (discussing the evolution of the law regarding whether a child could recover for
prenatal injuries).
28. Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Branton, 118 So. 741, 743 (1928) (emphasis added).
En ventre sa mere “refers to an unborn child, [usually] in the context of a discussion of that
child’s rights. If the child is en ventre sa mere at the time of a decedent’s death and is
subsequently born alive, the child is treated as having been in existence at the time of the
decedent’s death for purposes of inheritance.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 651 (10th ed. 2014).
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B. THE SEPARATE EXISTENCE VIEW
In 1940, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that some courts
were departing from the connected view and considering the adoption of
the separate existence view of pregnancy:
[a]t early common law the mother and child until birth were
considered as one, the child was not deemed to have an existence
independent of the parent. As a result, an injury to an unborn child
was looked upon as an injury to the mother. It is true that the unity
of mother and child has been relaxed in modern times and that
today for some beneficial purposes a child en ventre sa mere is
considered as born.29
Importantly, in contrasting the connected and separate existence views the
Pennsylvania court explicated that under the connected view, injury to the
fetus was regarded as an injury to the pregnant woman. This perspective,
that the proper locus of fetal injury is the injury to the pregnant woman,
was lost when the courts adopted the separate existence view of
pregnancy.30
By 1955, the connected view had lost considerable support.31 That
year, in a carefully considered opinion, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected
the connected view.32 In its place, it embraced the modern view that a child
could recover for damages sustained post-viability.33 Just two years earlier,
a New York court had adopted a more extreme version of the separate
existence view when it declared that the legal entity of the child began at
conception and, therefore, a child born alive was entitled to recovery for
injuries sustained anytime during pregnancy.34 The trend to recognize the
29. Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 16 A.2d 28, 28 (Pa. 1940), abrogated by Sinkler v.
Kneale, 164 A.2d 93 (Pa. 1960) (emphasis added).
30. See Gregory J. Roden, Prenatal Tort Law and the Personhood of the Unborn Child:
A Separate Legal Existence, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 207, 223 (2003) (noting that during the
early twentieth century, state courts began granting a right of action to an unborn child
individually as a separate legal entity distinct from its mother based upon the will of the
people as expressed by their legislature).
31. Mallison v. Pomeroy, 291 P.2d 225 (Or. 1955). New York rejected Justice Holmes’
view and adopted the separate existence view in 1951, in Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691
(N.Y. 1951). See also Vernennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949) (holding that
father could bring suit against physician and hospital responsible for the death of his wife
and unborn son during wife’s labor because child was a person separate from his mother at
the time of the prenatal injury); Lerner, supra note 27 (tracing civil actions at common law
to recover for wrongful death).
32. Mallison, 291 P.2d at 225.
33. Id.
34. Kelly v. Gregory, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953) (the first case to allow
recovery by an infant for prenatal injuries incurred during the mother’s ninth month of
pregnancy wherein the child was born alive, but died soon after as a result of the injury).
See also Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d 352 (La. Ct. App. 1923); Elizabeth F. Collins, An
Overview and Analysis: Prenatal Torts, Preconception Torts, Wrongful Life, Wrongful
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separate existence view was characterized as “simply” bringing the law
“into accord with the demand of natural justice which requires recognition
of the legal right of every human being to begin life unimpaired by physical
or mental defects resulting from the negligence of another.”35
Thus, tort law developed two contrasting conceptualizations of
pregnancy. According to the connected view, pregnancy was framed as a
connected mother and fetus, inseparable at law until birth.36 The fetus was
not recognized as independently existing. As a result, the fetus could not
recover for its prenatal injuries. The mother could recover damages for
fetal injuries, to the limited extent that the law would recognize that she
By contrast, the separate existence view
sustained damages.37
conceptualized post-viability pregnancy as the embodiment of two distinct,
separable beings, each with an independent legal existence.38 The fetus
was entitled to recover damages for injuries sustained prenatally.39
Importantly, the shift from the connected view to the separate existence
view was driven, at least in part, by pragmatic concerns. Courts reasoned
that adoption of the separate existence view was the only way to right the
In other words, courts
wrong caused by tortious injury to a fetus.40
determined that the only way they could provide a remedy for prenatal
injury was to recognize the fetus’s separate existence while it was trapped

Death, and Wrongful Birth: Time for a New Framework, 22 J. FAM. L. 677, 680 (1983–84);
Lerner, supra note 27, at 987 (noting the rule “that a surviving child should be granted a
right of action for injuries sustained at any time during the gestation period regardless of
viability has found little support among the authorities”). For a discussion of the history of
abortion regulation see Tracy A. Thomas, Misappropriating Women’s History in the Law
and the Politics of Abortion, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2012) (“The public shift from
acceptance to criminalization of early term abortion played out in . . . New York. Beginning
in 1828, the revisers of the New York code expanded the offense of abortion to
include abortions prior to quickening and elevated post-quickening abortion from a
misdemeanor to a felony with an exception for therapeutic abortions necessary for the health
of the mother. One legal scholar concluded, based on the revisers’ notes, that the law was
primarily concerned with protecting women from surgical malpractice and death
from abortion procedures during a time before the invention of antiseptic. In 1845,
the New York legislature enacted a comprehensive law to criminalize abortion through
medicines or procedures and to punish the provider of abortions for manslaughter in the
second degree. For the first time, this act brought the woman herself under the criminal
sanctions of the statute rather than punishing only the doctor, midwife, or pharmacist.”).
See also JANET FARRELL BRODIE, CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 253–88 (1994) (for a history of the criminalization of contraception and abortion).
35. Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 903 (N.Y. 1969); see also In re Unborn Child,
683 N.Y.S.2d 366, 369 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1998); Gloria C. v. William C., 476 N.Y.S.2d 991
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984).
36. Dietrich, 138 Mass. 17.
37. Id.; Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Branton, 118 So. 741, 743 (Ala. 1928); Berlin v. J. C.
Penney Co., 16 A.2d 28, 28 (Pa. 1940), abrogated by Sinkler v. Kneale, 164 A.2d 93 (Pa. 1960).
38. Allaire v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 56 N.E. 638 (Ill. 1900).
39. Kelly, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 696; Mallison v. Pomeroy, 291 P.2d 225 (Or. 1955).
40. In re Unborn Child, 683 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
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in its mother’s womb, and allow it to bring suit, post-birth, on its own
behalf. Thus, the judicial embrace of the separate existence view of the
fetus was pragmatically, not theoretically, driven.41
Adoption of the separate existence view was not based on
determinations of the nature of pregnancy, the pregnant woman, the fetus,
or the mother-child relationship. Though the law grappled with the issue of
viability, its analysis failed to theorize the maternal-fetal relationship and
the nature of pregnancy. Instead, jurists determined that justice required
allowing a child to recover for prenatal injuries, and they reverse-analyzed
that the only way to allow such a recovery was to hold—regardless of the
truth of the matter42—that a fetus had a separate existence. The fact that no
court recognized that justice could be served by allowing the mother,43 as
the literal embodiment and logical representative of the child, to bring suit
to recover for the loss of the child or the injury sustained by the child is
indicative of the law’s failure to recognize pregnancy as a unique and
unparalleled relational reality exhibiting unprecedented connectedness.44
C. THE ADVERSARIAL VIEW
Though family privacy was constitutionally recognized in the early
1900s,45 the United States Supreme Court did not analyze the nature of
pregnancy until its 1973 Roe v. Wade decision.46 Through Roe, pregnancy
was conceptualized as the embodiment of two distinct, separable beings,
with adversarial interests. To ensure protection of both maternal and fetal
interests, the Court identified four relevant legal actors in each pregnancy:
the woman, the fetus, the physician, and the State. Though the Court
believed that pregnancy, physiologically, concerned two beings: a woman
and a fetus; legally, it identified four actors: the woman, the fetus, the
physician, and the State. Roe protected the woman’s relationship with her
pregnancy, in consultation with her physician, through the 14th
Amendment right to privacy.47 Meanwhile, it empowered the State to act
41. Id.; Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 903 (N.Y. 1969); Gloria C. v. William C.,
476 N.Y.S.2d 991 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984).
42. See infra Part II.
43. While some courts were willing to allow the mother to recover for injuries to the
fetus that were not “too remote” to her; see Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Branton, 118 So.
741, 743 (Ala. 1928), there was no recognition that a mother could recover for the full
extent of prenatal injury to the fetus.
44. See generally Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887).
45. See generally Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
46. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Prior to 1973 no U.S. Supreme Court case
directly addressed pregnancy, though they came close in the series of cases addressing
contraception. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); see infra note 50.
47. Initially, the woman’s right to privacy was fully derivative of her doctor’s right to
provide her with medical care. In the contraception cases (supra note 46) and in Roe v.
Wade, the court viewed reproduction as a medical issue, not a women’s issue. Roe, 410 U.S.
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to protect its interests in maternal health, the fetus, and potential life.48
Pursuant to Roe, courts are authorized to balance the pregnant woman’s
rights and interests against those of the fetus and the State.49 Like the tort
cases, this constitutional conceptualization of pregnancy embraces the
separate existence view that the woman and fetus are separable and distinct
during pregnancy. However, unlike the tort cases, the constitutional
conceptualization of pregnancy adds third parties, the physician and the
State, to the adjudication of pregnancy matters. More importantly, unlike
the tort separate existence view, the constitutional separate existence view
of pregnancy identifies the mother and the fetus as legal adversaries. For
this reason, I call the conceptualization of pregnancy in the abortion
context the adversarial view.
Throughout the 1900s, the Supreme Court struggled to define the
parameters of the fundamental rights that ultimately formed the
constitutional basis for reproductive rights.50 In 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska,
at 166. It was not until Planned Parenthood v. Casey that the Court situated reproductive
rights as being an issue of women’s rights. 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (“Abortion is a unique
act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others: for the woman who must live with the
implications of her decision; for the persons who perform and assist in the procedure. . . .
Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow that the State is entitled to proscribe it in all
instances. That is because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the
human condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a child to full term is
subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear. That these
sacrifices have from the beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride
that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be
grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is too intimate and
personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role,
however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture. The
destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her
spiritual imperatives and her place in society.”) (emphasis added).
48. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65 (establishing State’s interest in maternal health and, in postviability, the potentiality of human life).
49. Id.
50. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (holding that a ban on partial-birth
abortions did not place an undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion during her second
trimester due to the availability of other late-term abortion methods); Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming its central holding in
Roe v. Wade, the Court determined that a state statute that has the purpose or effect of
placing substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before viability is
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment for placing an undue burden on her right
to abortion); Roe, 410 U.S. at 113 (holding that a woman’s fundamental right to privacy
under the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed the decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy, but determining that the state had a right to regulate abortions after the first
trimester and prohibit them after the fetus attained viability); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) (holding that a state’s restrictions on an unmarried woman’s right to obtain
contraceptives violated the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution for unlawfully
discriminating against women based on marital status); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (holding that a state statute prohibiting married couples from using
contraceptives was unconstitutional for invading the right of privacy surrounding the
marriage relationship); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (determining that a state
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the Supreme Court first recognized that individuals have the fundamental
right to “establish a home and bring up children” as part of their
Constitutional liberty guarantee.51 In 1925, the Court built upon this holding
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and determined that parents’ liberty interest
included the right to direct the nature of their children’s education.52 The
Court determined that a state statute requiring that children attend public
schools “unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”53 The
Court reasoned that the “fundamental theory of liberty . . . excludes any
general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to
accept instruction from public teachers only.”54 Importantly, the Court
recognized the paramount interest that parents have in their children. It
explained, “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”55 Thus, by 1925,
the Supreme Court had acknowledged that the parent-child relationship gave
rise to fundamentally protected rights and that parents ought to be free from
unreasonable interference with those rights.
Nevertheless, two years later, the Court refused to protect a woman’s
right to become a mother. In Buck v. Bell, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a Virginia state law authorizing the sterilization of
“mental defectives” against a due process challenge.56 In a decision penned
by Justice Holmes, the Court declared that the sterilization of Carrie Buck
pursuant to state law did not violate her due process or equal protection
rights.57 In this brief decision, Justice Holmes made no mention of the
fundamental rights recognized in Meyer and Pierce.58 His focus was
exclusively on the State interest in sterilizing “imbeciles.”59 Holmes

statute providing for the sterilization of habitual criminals violated the Equal Protection
clause of the Constitution); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390 (holding that a state statute that
attempted to control the type of education that parents could provide to their children
unconstitutionally invaded the liberty right guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment).
51. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
52. Pierce, 268 U.S. 510.
53. Id. at 534–35.
54. Id. at 535.
55. Id.
56. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205–07 (1927) (wherein Justice Holmes famously
reasoned that, “three generations of imbeciles are enough”).
57. Id. at 207.
58. Holmes also made no mention of his view that during pregnancy the fetus is part of
the mother. The implication is that Holmes’ connected view was not an understanding of
pregnancy from the perspective of a woman, but rather an understanding of pregnancy from
the perspective of the outside observer. If Holmes had understood the significance of
pregnancy to the lives of many women, he might not have so easily concluded that to deny a
woman the ability to become pregnant and have a child was no violation of any right at all.
59. Buck, 274 U.S. at 206.
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reasoned that it would be “better for all the world” if the State would sterilize
those who are “manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.”60 Finding that
Carrie Buck’s rights were not violated by the State’s forcible sterilization of
her, he likened state mandated sterilization to state mandated vaccination.61
Notwithstanding a robust national eugenics policy during the early
decades of the 1900s62 and the Supreme Court’s affirmation of that policy
in its 1927 Buck v. Bell decision, in 1942, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the forced sterilization of individuals pursuant to state
law “implicates a sensitive and important area of human rights.”63 In
Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court struck down an Oklahoma law calling for
sterilization of those convicted two or more times of felonies involving
moral turpitude.64 Justice William Douglas explained the case’s
significance in language that clearly displayed revulsion toward the policies
of America’s then-enemy, Nazi Germany:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the
basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. The
power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and
devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or
types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and
disappear. There is no redemption for the individual whom the law
touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is to his
irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.65
Therefore, in the 1940s there was an important shift in the Supreme
Court’s privacy jurisprudence. Through Skinner, the Court, for the first

60. Buck, 274 U.S. at 206.
61. Id. In likening the State’s power to sterilize individuals to the State’s power to
vaccinate its citizens, Holmes cited to Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1902). In
Jacobson, the Court held that requiring residents to be vaccinated or revaccinated against
smallpox was a valid act of the State pursuant to its police power and did not violate
residents’ constitutional rights. The Court noted: “‘The possession and enjoyment of all
rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing
authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the
community. Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act
according to one’s own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to
the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. It is, then, liberty regulated by law.’” Id.
at 26–27.
62. “29 States enacted compulsory eugenic sterilization laws between 1907 and 1931.”
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 463 (1985) (citing JACOB H.
LANDMAN, HUMAN STERILIZATION 302–03 (1932)).
63. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942). Certainly, the Court’s decision was
influenced by growing awareness concerning the eugenics policies administered in Nazi
Germany.
64. Id. at 536, 543.
65. Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
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time, recognized that the right to conceive a child was fundamental.
Separate and distinct from the family rights that had been established in
Meyer and Pierce, the Court clearly recognized that an individual has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in choosing to reproduce at some
yet unidentified time in the future.66
Despite its holding in Skinner, in 1961, in Poe v. Ullman, the Supreme
Court refused to rule on the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute that
criminalized the use of contraceptives.67 The majority claimed that the
constitutionality of the law was not justiciable because there was no actual
threat that the statute would be used to prosecute plaintiffs.68 Therefore,
the Court refused to analyze the constitutionality of a law criminalizing
contraceptive use and did not provide any analysis of the rights that might
be infringed upon by such a law. However, in his dissent, Justice John
Marshall Harlan, having decided that the State law was justiciable,
analyzed its constitutionality.69 Justice Harlan concluded that the law was
an unconstitutional violation of a marital couple’s privacy interest.70 He
relied on the aforementioned privacy holdings in Meyer, Pierce, and
Skinner, and on the constitutional protections of the Third and Fourth
Amendments securing persons against the quartering of soldiers during
times of peace and unreasonable searches and seizures, to reason that the
marital couple has a privacy interest in the intimate aspects of their
relations.71 Importantly, unlike in Skinner where the Court was compelled
to protect the individual’s “basic civil right” and “liberty” to be free from
“irreparable injury” through state-forced sterilization,72 here, Justice Harlan
dissented to protect the intimacy of the rights of the marital couple.73 The
distinction is significant. The right in Skinner could have provided the
foundation for an individual right to procreate. By contrast, in his dissent,
Harlan argued to extend the marital couple’s right to procreate to include
access to contraception.74

66. Despite the fact that Skinner clearly established that forced sterilizations are
unconstitutional, between 2006 and 2010 the State of California “coercively sterilized at
least 148 women . . . incarcerated at the California Institute for Women in Corona and
Valley State Prison for Women in Chowchilla.” Rebecca Ryan, California Female Inmate
Sterilizations: Why We’re Appalled, But Not Surprised, WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT BLOG (July
12, 2013), https://womenslawproject.wordpress.com/2013/07/12/california-female-inmatesterilizations-why-were-appalled-but-not-surprised/.
67. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 504–05 (1961).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 522–56.
70. Id. at 539.
71. Id. at 543–44.
72. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 497, 541 (1961).
73. Poe, 367 U.S. at 539.
74. Of course, this matter was put to rest in Eisenstadt v. Baird, when the Court explained
that any rights belonging to the marital couple must be derived from the individuals who
form the marital couple. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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The rights of the marital unit prevailed and in 1965, Harlan’s Poe
dissent formed the foundation for the Court’s decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut.75 There, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the right to privacy
established in Meyer, Pierce, and Skinner, and extended it to include the
right of “married persons” to use contraceptives.76 The Court reasoned that
the Connecticut statute criminalizing contraceptive use unconstitutionally
affected “a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees.”77 The Court struck down the state
law and noted that it was “repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding
the marriage relationship.”78
Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme Court shifted its
privacy analysis once again and determined that the fundamental right to
use contraceptives was an individual privacy right, rather than a marital
privacy right.79 In Eisenstadt, the Court declared unconstitutional a
Massachusetts law that restricted the distribution of contraceptive
devices.80 Specifically, the law limited the distribution of contraceptive
devices for the purpose of preventing pregnancy to married persons only.81
Notably, the law permitted the distribution of contraceptive devices to
prevent the transmission of disease to both single and married persons.82
Thus, while the law permitted single persons to acquire contraceptive
devices to prevent disease, it barred them from acquiring such devices to
prevent pregnancy.83
In determining whether the law could be sustained “simply as a
prohibition on contraception,” the Court quoted the appellate court’s
determination that a ban on contraceptives on the basis of immorality
“conflicts with fundamental human rights.”84 It explained that, “whatever
the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights
must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.”85 The
Eisenstadt Court thereby acknowledged an individual’s right to prevent
pregnancy.86 Further, in arguing for the equal treatment of the married and
the unmarried, the Court clarified that all marital privacy rights are
inherently individual privacy rights. It famously explained that any rights
held by the married couple would necessarily be derivative of rights held
by the individual members of the couple:
75. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
76. Griswold, 381 U.S. 480–81, 485. The Court also cited to the right to privacy as
discussed in Harlan’s Poe dissent. Id. at 484.
77. Id. at 485.
78. Id. at 486.
79. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
80. Id. at 453.
81. Id. at 441–42.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 452–53 (quoting 429 F.2d 1398, 1402 (1st Cir. 1970)).
85. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
86. Id.
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[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a
separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.87
Thus, in Eisenstadt, for the first time, the Supreme Court held that the
individual has a constitutionally protected privacy right to prevent
becoming pregnant.
Although the Court’s decision never discussed pregnancy as a
woman’s issue, its principal effect was to bestow upon women the right to
use contraceptives to control their reproductive futures. Coupled with the
Court’s holding in Skinner, acknowledging the individual’s fundamental
right to procreate, as of 1972 women had the constitutional privacy right to
make decisions regarding whether “to bear or beget a child” free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion.88 For the first time in women’s
history, the right to choose whether or not to become pregnant and have a
child was constitutionally recognized.
Despite the significance of Eisenstadt as a reproductive rights case, it
nevertheless did little to shed light on the legal conceptualization of
pregnancy. In fact, in Eisenstadt there was no discussion at all concerning
the relationship between a woman and her pregnancy. The Court’s silence
on the matter of pregnancy finally began to abate the following year. In
Roe v. Wade, the Court announced that the fundamental right to privacy
was “broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.”89 Though Roe has been criticized for failing to
recognize abortion as a women’s issue,90 it was the first Supreme Court
case that gave any meaningful attention to the significance of pregnancy

87. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. (internal citations omitted).
88. Id.; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541. (1942).
89. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
90. Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77, 799 (1995) (criticizing the Supreme
Court’s view, beginning in Roe v. Wade, that pregnant women are merely patients by
regarding the decision to have an abortion as purely a medical one where the doctor’s
judgment was paramount to the woman’s concerns). “In Roe v. Wade, it was not entirely
clear to whom the privacy belonged. The leading feminist criticism of Roe has long been
that it reads like a manifesto for doctors’ rights rather than women’s rights, suggesting that
whether to abort is the doctor’s decision, even when the reasons are non-medical.” Jennifer
S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right to Abortion, 45
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 334 (2010). See also Jonathan Bullington, Justice Ginsburg:
Roe v. Wade Not ‘Woman Centered’, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 11, 2013, http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/2013-05-11/news/chi-justice-ginsburg-roe-v-wade-not-womancentered20130511_1_roe-v-abortion-related-cases-wade-case.
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and motherhood in the lives of women.91 In reasoning why the “right of
privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy,” the Court explained:
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early
pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring,
may force upon the woman a distressful life and future.
Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health
may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all
concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the
problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in
this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed
motherhood may be involved.92
Thus, the Court indicated some awareness of how motherhood can affect
the life of a woman and the kinds of circumstances she might consider in
making her decision.93 However, the Court cautioned that this personal
decision was one for the woman to make in consultation with “her
responsible physician.”94 In other words, after explaining why a woman
might choose to terminate her pregnancy, the Court stressed that she could
not make that choice alone. Rather, a woman would consider “[a]ll these
factors” with “her responsible physician.”95 After all, reasoned the Court,
“the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical
decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician.”96
Therefore, while Roe was, from a practical perspective, a groundbreaking
reproductive rights case that enabled women to exercise their selfdeterminative right to prevent motherhood even after they became pregnant,
the legal position taken by the Court was that abortion is, primarily, a
medical decision, not a woman’s decision.97 Therefore, like other Supreme
Court cases affecting women before it, Roe only limitedly theorized the
relationship between a woman, her pregnancy, and motherhood.98

91. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
92. Id.
93. The Court did not consider the physiological nature of pregnancy or the relationship
between a woman and pregnancy. Its focus was exclusively on the social consequences of
having a baby. While important, it reflected a very limited understanding of the nature and
significance of pregnancy.
94. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 166.
97. Id.; See also Donald D. Rotunda, On Deep Background 41 Years Later: Roe v. Wade,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 22, 2014, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-22/opinion/ctperspec-blackmun-0122-20140122_1_blackmun-roe-v-chief-justice-burger.
98. Feminist legal theorists have considered other bases upon which women’s right to
abortion could have been founded. For example, see Rosalind Dixon & Martha Nussbaum,
Abortion, Dignity and a Capabilities Approach, in FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM: GLOBAL
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Ultimately, in Roe’s view, pregnancy is inherently a medical matter that
impacts the pregnant woman, her doctor, the fetus, and the State.
The view of abortion as, primarily, a medical decision was
subsequently clarified by the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey:
Whatever constitutional status the doctor-patient relation may have
as a general matter, in the present context it is derivative of the
woman’s position. The doctor-patient relation does not underlie or
override the two more general rights under which the abortion right
is justified: the right to make family decisions and the right to
physical autonomy.99
Despite this theoretical shift, Casey affirmed Roe’s central holding.100 Like
other Supreme Court cases affecting women before it, Roe failed to
theorize the relationship between a woman, her pregnancy, and
motherhood. Further, it characterized the abortion decision as “inherently,
and primarily” a medical decision.101 In contrast, Casey characterized it as
a woman’s decision.102 Ultimately, in Roe’s view, pregnancy consists of a
woman, her doctor, a fetus, and its state. In Casey, the Court clarified that
the right upon which abortion was founded was situated in the woman.
Moreover, in both Casey and Roe, the Court acknowledged that in making
her decision, a pregnant woman would consider the interests of the fetus
within her.
In Roe, when discussing the reasons why a woman might choose to
terminate her pregnancy, the court seemed cognizant that a pregnant
woman would consider both her interests and the interests of her unborn
child. The Court included medical reasons, ostensibly both those
concerning the health of the mother and the fetus, in its list of relevant
factors a woman would consider in determining whether to terminate the
PERSPECTIVES 64 (Beverley Baines et al. eds., 2012) (discussing a human dignity approach
to recognizing a woman’s right to abortion); see Rebecca Rausch, Reframing Roe: Property
Over Privacy, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 28, 52 (2012) (considering reframing Roe
in the language of property, specifically a woman’s property interest in her uterus).
99. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992); see Erin Daly,
Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77 (1995) (discussing that Casey was the first case
to view abortion as a woman’s decision as opposed to a medical decision).
100. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (“Roe’s essential holding, the holding we reaffirm, has three
parts. First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State. Before viability, the
State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition
of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure. Second is a
confirmation of the State’s power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains
exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health. And third is the
principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting
the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.”).
101. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156.
102. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
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pregnancy. In addition, the Court identified social reasons why a woman
might seek to terminate the pregnancy. The social reasons identified by the
Court included reasons that could be fairly characterized as serving the
mother’s interest, as well as those that would serve the interests of the
mother’s other children, her family, and even the child that the fetus might
become. Specifically, the court recognized that the woman would consider
the “distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child,”103 a
reason that certainly implies that the Court believes that the woman is
making her decision with regard to not just her own self-interest, but also
with regard for the interests of “all concerned”—likely including her
Thus, Roe’s
husband or partner, her children, and the fetus.104
consideration of why a mother would terminate her pregnancy was not
framed in a necessarily adversarial context. In identifying reasons like “the
problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically
and otherwise, to care for it[,]”105 the Court seemed to acknowledge that the
woman’s termination decision might be based, as well, on the interests of
her unborn child.
In Casey, the Court similarly determined that in deciding whether to
continue her pregnancy, a woman will consider the interests of her fetus.
For example, the Court recognized that some view abortion as a means of
preventing “cruelty to the child” and “anguish to the parent” as a result of
“the inability to provide for the nurture and care of the infant.”106
Moreover, the Court declared that, without a doubt, “most women
considering an abortion would deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not
dispositive, to the decision” and that ensuring that the woman’s decision is
an informed one “reduc[es] the risk that a woman may elect an abortion,
only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that
her decision was not fully informed.”107 Therefore, like in Roe, in Casey,
103. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853.
107. Id. at 882. The Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart further developed this view
of pregnancy wherein the woman is concerned for the fetus. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124, 159–60 (2007) (“Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of
love the mother has for her child. The Act recognizes this reality as well. Whether to have
an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral decision. While we find no reliable data to
measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. . . . It is selfevident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief more
anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the event, what she did not
know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of
her unborn child, a child assuming the human form.”). In her dissent, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg criticized the majority’s discussion of the woman’s fragility as a justification for
the abortion restriction at issue. She argued:
Because of women’s fragile emotional state and because of the ‘bond of love
the mother has for her child,’ the Court worries, doctors may withhold
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the Court expressed its view that the pregnant woman’s decision regarding
whether or not to continue her pregnancy is informed by her concerns for
the interests of the fetal life developing in her womb.
This reading of Roe and Casey places the adversarial conceptualization
of pregnancy adopted by the Court at odds with its dicta.108 Despite
recognizing the physiological and social reasons behind why a woman
might choose to terminate her pregnancy, reasons that take into
consideration the interests of the woman’s family and her unborn child, the
Court established a legal framework that considers the woman and the fetus
as inherently adversarial, and appointed the State to act as proper protector
of the fetus. Although the Court assumed the woman was interested in her
fetus and concluded that the fetus was not a constitutionally recognized
“person,” the Court nevertheless, authorized the State to serve as
representative of fetal interests.109 As a result, the legal conceptualization
information about the nature of the intact D&E procedure. The solution the
Court approves, then, is not to require doctors to inform women, accurately
and adequately, of the different procedures and their attendant risks. Instead,
the Court deprives women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even
at the expense of their safety.
Id. at 183–84 (Ginsburg, R., dissenting). See also Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons:
Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of the Woman-Protective Anti-Abortion Argument,
57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008); see Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection:
Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1771, 1792 (2008)
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart reinforced gender
paternalism by perpetuating the idea that bans on certain types of abortion methods are
needed to protect the pregnant woman, while ensuring that she fulfills her natural role as
wife and mother).
108. See Stacy A. Scaldo, Deadly Dicta: Roe’s “Unwanted Motherhood,” Carhart II’s
“Women’s Regret,” and the Shifting Narrative of Abortion Jurisprudence, 6 DREXEL L.
REV. 87 (2013) (examining the dicta concerning unwanted motherhood and women’s regret
in the abortion cases and considering how it affects the long-term societal opinions and
understandings of reproductive rights).
109. Id. at 157–58; see also id. at 164–65 (“The Constitution does not define ‘person’ in so
many words. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains three references to ‘person.’
The first, in defining ‘citizens,’ speaks of ‘persons born or naturalized in the United States.’
The word also appears both in the Due Process Clause and in the Equal Protection Clause.
‘Person’ is used in other places in the Constitution . . . But in nearly all these instances, the
use of the word is such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any
assurance, that it has any possible prenatal application. All this, together without
observation, supra, that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal
abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word ‘person,’ as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.”); Id. at 163–64 (“For the
stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human
life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”);
Amy Lotierzo (comment), The Unborn Child, A Forgotten Interest: Reexamining Roe in
Light of Increased Recognition of Fetal Rights, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 279 (2006) (A pre-Carhart
consideration of how recognitions of the rights of the unborn through adoption of legislation
such as the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003 and the Unborn Victims of Violence Act of
2004 may affect reproductive rights.).
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of pregnancy embraced by Roe and Casey was grounded upon the
assumption that the woman and the fetus are legal adversaries and that the
State is needed to protect fetal interests. This view of the maternal-fetal
relationship as adversarial contrasts with the Court’s view of the parentchild relationship as conceptualized in Pierce, where it limited the State’s
ability to interfere with parental decisions.110 Of course, the cases can be
easily distinguished because Pierce concerned parental decisions regarding
childrearing while Roe concerned the parental decision to terminate
pregnancy.111 Though it can be argued that the decision to terminate a
pregnancy is not a parental decision,112 the Justices’ characterization of the
woman’s decision-making process in Roe and Casey suggests that, at least
in part, they believe it is.
Thus, the adversarial view of pregnancy first articulated in Roe was the
culmination of over a century of case law. Early cases holding that the
fetus was part of the mother demonstrated that the law initially viewed
pregnancy and the mother-fetus relationship as inherently connected. In
the search for a remedy for prenatal injuries, this view gave way to a
conceptualization of pregnancy as the embodiment of two distinct,
separable entities. This separate existence view, while recognizing a
separation between mother and fetus, refused to classify the mother and
fetus as adversarial.113 The refusal to allow a fetus to recover against its
110. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“[t]he child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”).
111. See Priscilla J. Smith, Responsibility for Life: How Abortion Serves Women’s Interests
in Motherhood, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 97 (2008) (discussing the Carhart court’s reliance on
maternal love to support its decision to uphold the ban on partial birth abortion and considering
the extent to which women’s abortion decisions are maternal decisions); Erin Daly,
Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77, 138 (1995) (noting that abortion decisions are unique to the
mother and father of the child because pregnancy relates to profound and far-reaching aspects
of their lives, as both may want to have children at a particular time in their lives, control their
destinies, participate in public life, and live by their own spiritual imperative).
112. See Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v. Wade:
Why Abortion Should be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 85, 167, 170 (2005)
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s decisions on abortion have damaged women physically,
psychologically, and relationally, and contend that state and local governments should be
allowed to regulate and monitor abortions, as well as formulate policies for it).
113. Very few courts have permitted a child to recover against its mother for prenatal
injuries sustained due to her negligence. See Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992)
(finding that a child could bring suit against her mother for negligently crossing a street
where she was struck by a vehicle when she was seven months pregnant, causing the child
to be born with severe and permanent disabilities); Nat’l Casualty Co. v. N. Trust Bank of
Fla., 807 So. 2d 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a child had a cause of action
against her mother where the mother’s negligent driving caused an automobile accident
when she was seven months pregnant, resulting in injuries to the child); Grodin v. Grodin,
301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (deciding that if a mother was unreasonably
negligent in taking the drug tetracycline while pregnant, then her son could maintain a cause
of action against her for the injuries he sustained as a result of his mother’s conduct).
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mother, illustrated the legal position that the mother and the fetus had an
inherently non-adversarial, connected relationship.114 In Roe v. Wade, the
Supreme Court modified the separate existence view of pregnancy to
include a vision of the mother and fetus as legal adversaries and
empowered the State to protect the fetus from the mother. This shift
forever changed the way courts view pregnancy both inside and outside of
the abortion context.
The adversarial view of pregnancy has had a significant impact on
pregnant women in medical intervention, criminal, and dependency cases.
The application of the adversarial view of pregnancy outside of the
abortion context is misguided. As the presentation of the nature of
pregnancy from both scientific and maternal perspectives in Part II will
demonstrate, pregnancy is a unique relational existential experience that
represents a simultaneous duality and oneness. The maternal-fetal
relationship is generally symbiotic and rarely adverse. Therefore, the legal
conceptualization of pregnancy as adversarial should not apply to wanted
pregnancies. Moreover, the legal conceptualization of pregnancy should be
reconceived to reflect the holistic nature of pregnancy supported by
scientific knowledge and maternal experience.

II. THE NATURE OF PREGNANCY115
Pregnancy is unlike any other aspect of human existence. Pregnancy is
a unique relational existential experience.116 No other human experience
114. Sallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (Ill. 1980) (while recognizing that a
subsequently born child has assertable legal rights against third parties for prenatal injuries,
the court states that “[i]t would be a legal fiction to treat the fetus as a separate legal person
with rights hostile to and assertable against its mother”); Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (determining that the child’s mother was immune from suit if her
allegedly negligent act of taking the medication tetracycline while pregnant involved an
exercise of reasonable parental discretion); Cullotta v. Cullotta, 678 N.E.2d 717 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1997) (holding that a mother had no legal duty to her unborn child at the time she was in
an automobile accident that resulted in the child being born prematurely and suffering other
injuries); Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E.2d 260 (Mass. 2004) (finding that a child could not
bring suit against its mother for the negligent infliction of prenatal injuries because
recognizing a legal duty of care to her unborn child would have profound legal
consequences); Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999) (concluding that a child
could not maintain an action against its mother for injuries caused by the mother’s frequent
drug use throughout the pregnancy because the court could not dictate a pregnant woman’s
conduct toward her unborn child).
115. Professors Owen D. Jones and Timothy H. Goldsmith argue that legal thinkers ought
to consider interdisciplinary research, specifically research concerning human behavior, in
reaching legal determinations. Owen D. Jones & Timonthy H. Goldsmith, Law and
Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005). They approve of recent legal
scholarship that seeks to “deploy insights from behavioral biology to address existing
problems in law.” Id. at 409.
116. Clinical anatomist David Bainbridge describes pregnancy as a “uniquely intimate
relationship between two people.” DAVID BAINBRIDGE, MAKING BABIES: THE SCIENCE OF
PREGNANCY 6 (2000). Though Bainbridge’s definition describes pregnancy a relationship
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reflects a relationship as necessarily intertwined as the one experienced
during pregnancy.117 As sociologist Barbara Katz Rothman eloquently
articulated, “[m]otherhood is an experience of interpersonal connection.
The isolated, atomistic individual is an absurdity when one is pregnant: one
is two, two are one.”118 Father of modern medicine, William Harvey,
pioneered the idea that pregnancy represents a duality: “just as much as a
pregnancy needs a baby, pregnancy also needs a mother.”119 Thus, a
pregnant woman is neither one nor two,120 and yet, she is both. Pregnancy
represents duality: it has two parts, maternal and fetal. Simultaneously,
pregnancy represents oneness: The mother and fetus are inextricably united
and a part of each other.
A. THE PHYSIOLOGY OF PREGNANCY121
Pregnancy is a period of extraordinary transformation. Pregnancy
turns a fertilized egg into a baby and a woman into a mother. Pregnancy’s
transformative process impacts both woman and fetus through distinct but
interrelated mechanisms. The impact of pregnancy on the woman and the
fetus are different yet complementary.122
Initial aspects of this
transformative process begin with conception.123 Pregnancy commences
between two “people,” his work stresses the uniqueness of this relationship in ways that
imply that his description of “two people” is due to linguistic limitations. We have no
words to describe the relationship between mother and fetus.
117. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 116, at 6. (stating “Never again outside pregnancy can we be
so truly intertwined with someone else, no matter how hard we try.”). I am working on a
follow-up article considering the legal conceptualization of the mother-infant relationship. I
argue that, similar to pregnancy, the mother-infant relationship is uniquely connected. See,
e.g., MEREDITH F. SMALL, OUR BABIES, OURSELVES: HOW BIOLOGY AND CULTURE SHAPE
THE WAY WE PARENT 35 (1998) (“The word ‘entrained’ is often used to explain this
relationship. Entrainment is a kind of biological feedback system across two organisms, in
which the movement and patterns of one influence the other. Entrainment, in this context,
means that the physiology of the two individuals is so entwined that, in a biological sense,
where one goes, the other follows, and vice versa.”).
118. BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY
IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 89 (1989).
119. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 116, at 55.
120. Author Susan Maushart describes pregnancy as “kind of no-woman’s land, in which one is
not quite mother, but no longer other.” SUSAN MAUSHART, THE MASK OF MOTHERHOOD: HOW
BECOMING A MOTHER CHANGES OUR LIVES AND WHY WE NEVER TALK ABOUT IT 37 (2000).
121. For a thorough explanation of the physiology of pregnancy, see PETER T. ELLISON,
ON FERTILE GROUND: A NATURAL HISTORY OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 1–80 (2001).
122. Pregnancy changes a woman’s body and mind preparing her to be a mother.
Pregnancy transforms an egg into a highly dependent baby. Though the woman and egg are
changed in different ways, the changes are complementary because the end result is
significant physiological changes in the mother that serve only to respond to a baby’s needs;
and the baby who needs such a mother. See SMALL, supra note 117, at 14–15.
123. LOUANN BRIZENDINE, THE FEMALE BRAIN 98 (2006) (“The mommy-brain
transformation gets under way at conception, . . . changing the way she thinks, feels, and
what she finds important”); see also ELLISON, supra note 121, at 19–32 (discussing the
fertilization process).
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with the embedding of an embryo in the mother’s uterine lining.124
Successful implantation requires a delicate interaction between the mother
and the embryo in which each is an active participant.125 The embryo
aggressively digs itself into the mother’s uterine wall.126 This invasive
implantation process results in the embryo being bathed in maternal blood
and attaching to the mother’s blood supply.127 To signal its presence, the
embryo releases large quantities of the hCG hormone.128 Upon receiving
the hCG signal, the mother’s body responds by ceasing its normal
menstrual cycle.129 The attachment of the embryo to the mother’s blood
supply commences a process of hormonal and physiological changes in the
pregnant woman, priming her to nurture her baby both in utero and
postpartum.130
The pregnancy will last approximately forty weeks.131 By the seventh
week, the embryo takes on a recognizably human form.132 By this time,
most of its internal organs have been developed and its sex is
determined.133 By the end of the second trimester, all fetal organs are
formed.134 Around the fifth month of pregnancy, the mother starts to feel
the movements of her fetus and begins to emotionally attach to her baby.135

124. ELLISON, supra note 121, at 22–23 (refuting the idea that fertilization is the beginning
of pregnancy: “Successful implantation, not the mere fertilization of the egg, is the true
initiation of a potentially viable pregnancy. Many would-be embryos may pass through a
woman’s uterus in her lifetime without succeeding at this task, either because the embryo
itself is defective or because the endometrium is at an inappropriate stage of its own
developmental cycle or is pathologically disabled.”).
125. Id. at 23 (stating “Successful implantation depends on the active interaction of the embryo
and the mother. It is not something that one does to the other. The mother’s endometrium must
be receptive to the embryo, and the embryo must be able to implant itself.”).
126. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 116, at 93.
127. Id.
128. The pregnancy hormone referred to as “hCG” is the human chorionic gonadotrophin
hormone. Id.
129. Id. at 114; see id. at 92–94.
130. BRIZENDINE, supra note 123, at 95–103; Ruth Feldman, et al., Evidence for a
Neuroendocrinological Foundation of Human Affiliation: Plasma Oxytocin Levels Across
Pregnancy and the Postpartum Period Predict Mother-Infant Bonding, 18 PSYCHOLOGICAL
SCIENCE 965 (2007); Lane Strathearn, Maternal Neglect: Oxytocin, Dopamine and the
Neurobiology of Attachment, 23 J. OF NEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 1054, 1054 (2011)
(“[B]iological mothers may be primed, through the neuroendocrine changes associated with
pregnancy, parturition and lactation, to provide optimal nurturance and protection to their
offspring”).
131. ELLISON, supra note 121, at 71.
132. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 116, at 115.
133. Id.
134. ELLISON, supra note 121, at 62.
135. BRIZENDINE, supra note 123, at 99; SMALL, supra note 117, at 27 (pregnant women
begin to bond with their babies even when the mother has negative feelings about her
pregnancy) (citing A.S. Fleming, Hormonal and Experiential Correlates of Maternal
Responsiveness in Human Mothers, in MAMALIAN PARENTING 184–208 (N.A. Krasnegor &
R.S. Bridges eds., 1990)).
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The fetal skeleton is laid down in cartilage and ossification commences.136
Fetal brain stem functions and sensory responses indicate that the fetus has
functional cortical brain circuits.137 During the third trimester, the fetus
continues to grow and accumulate fat.138 The brain grows significantly
during this time.139 In the last weeks of pregnancy, the lungs mature,
preparing the fetus to live outside its mother.140
Just as the fertilized egg transforms into an embryo and the embryo
transforms into a developing fetus, the pregnant woman experiences a
complementary transition to motherhood. Her process includes physical as
well as emotional changes. The mother’s blood is flooded with hormones
that change her body and brain.141 She is protected against stress hormones
produced by the fetus and the placenta.142 Her blood volume doubles.143
She experiences increased thirst, hunger, and fatigue.144 Her brain shrinks
in size in preparation for the production of new brain cells and new
networks of maternal circuits.145 The pregnant woman experiences
increased neural plasticity for the purpose of adapting her brain function for
motherhood.146 Ultimately her brain will be changed “structurally,
functionally, and in many ways, irreversibly,” preparing her for the birthing
process and to mother her new baby.147
B. ADVERSARIAL INTERESTS IN PREGNANCY
Even though the maternal and fetal aspects of the pregnancy process
are predominantly complementary, sometimes the genetic interests of the
mother and her fetus collide. Because the mother and fetus have distinct
genes, “things that are good for the spread of the offspring’s genes are not
necessarily good for the spread of the mother’s genes.”148 There may be
conflicts over the best use of maternal energy resources, such as whether
the mother should retain them for herself or share them with her developing

136. ELLISON, supra note 121, at 62.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. BRIZENDINE, supra note 123, at 97–103 (progesterone levels climb from ten to one
hundred times the normal levels during the first two to four months of pregnancy); see also
Dave Grattan, A Mother’s Brain Knows, 11 J. NEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 1188 (2011), available
at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/51724765_A_mother%27s_brain knows.
142. BRIZENDINE, supra note 123, at 97–103.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. By six months postpartum, the mother’s brain returns to its original size. Id. at 100.
Prolactin is involved in stimulating neurogenesis, the production of new cells, in the
maternal brain. Grattan, supra note 141, at 1188.
146. Grattan, supra note 141, at 1188.
147. BRIZENDINE, supra note 123, at 95, 100–01.
148. ELLISON, supra note 121, at 42.
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offspring.149 Research in Gambia demonstrated that a mother’s inadequate
caloric intake during pregnancy prompts her to lower her basal metabolic
rate, reduce her own energy consumption, and divert the energy to store fat
needed for embryonic development.150 Consequences of the lower
metabolic rate included compromising cognitive functions and
thermoregulatory abilities.151
Another example of the potentially
adversarial interests of the woman and fetus is preeclampsia.152 In a normal
pregnancy, the mother’s blood pressure rises to adapt to fetal vascular
demands.153 Sometimes, however, the mother can experience extreme
hypertension with fatal consequences.154 Though maternal-fetal conflicts
can be used to indicate that mother and fetus have an adversarial
relationship, they also demonstrate that, physiologically, once the mother
has committed to the pregnancy, she will continue to support it, even if
doing so is harmful to her wellbeing.155 Thus, research demonstrates that,
physiologically, pregnancy is defined more by symbiosis than conflict.156
C. BEYOND PREGNANCY
The postpartum period is of crucial importance to an infant’s
survival.157 Thus, it is no surprise that many of the changes that a mother
149. ELLISON, supra note 121, at 78.
150. Id. at 72–73.
151. Id. at 73.
152. Id. at 76.
153. Id. at 74.
154. Id. at 76.
155. Id. at 43 (“[A]n appeal to metabolic conflict between mother and offspring may not
be necessary. The fact of successful implantation alone may tip the scales of the
cost/benefit equation significantly since it implies that the embryo has passed a significant
‘viability’ test. The probability that a given pregnancy will be successful increases by at
least 33 percent after implantation, and the ‘cost’ necessary to tip the scales away from
further investment become equivalently higher. . . . Once an embryo has [successfully
implanted], maternal physiology seems to favor its continued survival even under adverse
conditions.”) Outside of the physiological context, woman and fetus may have adversarial
interests. All unwanted pregnancies are examples of the conflict and tension that may
accompany pregnancy. Though important, this aspect of adversity in pregnancy is outside
the scope of this article.
156. Abortion, which is outside the scope of my limited discussion of the physiology of
pregnancy, is a common and obvious example of maternal-fetal conflict. The abortion
decision represents a social conflict between woman and fetus. A woman’s desire for an
abortion has been described as follows: “No one wants an abortion as she wants an icecream cone or a Porsche. She wants an abortion as an animal, caught in a trap, wants to
gnaw off its own leg.” Hendricks, Body and Soul, supra note 90, at 361. Though this
analogy is insightful, it is not without problem, as it can be interpreted to suggest “that
abortion permanently harms a woman by killing a part of her, even if it is necessary to
escape a worse fate. That is true for some women, but other women are starfish, who will
grow a new leg and go on as before.” Id. at 361 n.149.
157. Feldman, supra note 130, at 965–70 (“The mother-infant bond, the primary bond
across mammalian species, is expressed in a clearly defined set of maternal postpartum
behaviors that emerge or intensify during the bonding stage. . . . Studies in humans [ ]
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experiences during pregnancy are for the benefit of the post-partum
mother-infant relationship.158 For example, a woman’s body prepares itself
for lactation during pregnancy.159 Some describe breastfeeding less as the
end result of pregnancy, and more as a continuation of gestation.160 This
view of breastfeeding is consistent with the view of anatomist and
paleontologist R.D. Martin that the human gestation period is actually
twenty-one months, nine months of pregnancy followed by twelve months
of postpartum care.161
New research indicates that hormonal surges during pregnancy that
modify the mother’s brain may also facilitate postpartum care.162 This
would help to explain why many mothers feel ready to bond with their
infants during the immediate postpartum period.163 Research findings
suggest that, “biological mothers may be primed, through neuroendocrine
changes associated with pregnancy, parturition and lactation, to provide
optimal nurturance and protection to their offspring.”164 A study out of
Bar-Ilan University found that initial pregnancy levels of neuropeptide
oxytocin predict postpartum bonding behaviors.165 Other research indicates
that adaptation of the mother’s oxytocin and dopamine systems, during
pregnancy and outside of pregnancy, impact a mother’s ability to provide
adequate postpartum care to her infant.166 Though there are indications that
indicate that maternal postpartum behavior has long-term effects on infants’ cognitive,
neurobehavioral, and social-emotional growth.”).
158. See BRIZENDINE, supra note 123, at 95.
159. SMALL, supra note 117, at 186–92.
160. Id. at 198 (“[The breastfeeding system] continues from conception to weaning and
thus is biologically designed to go on for months or years in a process called
‘exogestation’—gestation outside the womb that is still intimately connected. We know this
because of the profound effect that breast-feeding has on the female fertility system—
continuous breast-feeding stops ovulation and prevents conception.”).
161. SMALL, supra note 117, at 7 (1998) (citing MARTIN, R. D., PRIMATE ORIGINS AND
EVOLUTION: A PHYLOGENETIC RECONSTRUCTION (1990)).
162. See BRIZENDINE, supra note 123, at 95; Feldman, supra note 130, at 965; Strathearn,
supra note 130, at 1054–65 (identifying key biological systems that contributed to maternal
caregiving behavior, with focus on oxytocinergic and dopaminergic reward systems); Lane
Strathearn, et al., Does Breastfeeding Protect Against Substantiated Child Abuse and
Neglect? A 15-year Cohort Study, 123 PEDIATRICS 483, 483–93 (2009) (supporting the
claim that mothers may be biologically primed to provide the best care for their offspring
through neuroendocrine changes during pregnancy, birth, and breastfeeding).
163. See Marshall Klaus, Mother and Infant: Early Emotional Ties, 102 PEDIATRICS 1244,
1244–46 (1998). Describing her own experience of becoming a mother, Brizendine
explains: “Deeply buried in my genetic code were triggers for basic mothering behavior that
were primed by the hormones of pregnancy, activated by childbirth, and reinforced by close,
physical contact with my child.” BRIZENDINE, supra note 123, at 95.
164. Strathearn, supra note 130, at 1054. See also BRIZENDINE, supra note 123, at 95;
Feldman, supra note 130, at 965; Strathearn et al., supra note 162, at 483–93 (supporting the
claim that mothers may be biologically primed to provide the best care for their offspring
through neuroendocrine changes during pregnancy, birth, and breastfeeding).
165. Feldman, supra note 130, at 969.
166. Strathearn, supra note 130, at 1062 (finding that “the adaptation of the oxytocin and
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the hormonal changes a mother experiences during pregnancy impact her
postpartum mothering, this research is still in an early phase.167
D. MICROCHIMERISM
Doctors once believed that the fetal and maternal vascular systems
remained separate during pregnancy.168 We now know this is not the case.
During pregnancy, fetal cells travel into the mother’s body and maternal
cells travel into the fetal body.169 This two-way traffic of cells through the
placenta is called fetal and maternal microchimerism.170
The scientific meaning of “chimera” is an organism composed of cells
(or DNA) that originated in two or more genetically distinct individuals.171
Generally, each individual has a unique set of DNA markers that
distinguish the cells of that person from every other.172 It is the distinctness
of each person’s DNA that makes DNA testing such a useful law
enforcement tool.173 Where an individual is a chimera, however, she
possesses not only her own cells marked with her unique genetic code, but
also the cells of another.174

dopamine systems (whether through a mother’s own early childhood experience, stress
during pregnancy or even as a result of breastfeeding experience) may lead to variation in
infant and adult attachment, as well as maternal brain and endocrine responses.”).
167. Id. (“Additional studies are needed to explore the role of oxytocin in promoting a
secure mother-infant attachment.”).
168. Charlotte Boyon, et al., Fetal Microchimerism: Benevolence or Malevolence for the
Mother?, 158 EUROPEAN J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY & REPROD. BIOLOGY 148, 148 (2011).
169. Id. at 151; see also William F.N. Chan, et al., Male Microchimerism in the Human
Female Brain, 7(9) PLOS ONE (2012) (“During pregnancy, genetic material and cells are
bi-directionally exchanged between the fetus and mother, following which there can be
persistence of the foreign cells and/or DNA in the recipient”); J. Lee Nelson, The Otherness
of Self: Microchimerism in Health and Disease, 33(8) TRENDS IN IMMUNOLOGY 421, 421
(2012) (“It is now well recognized that some cells are exchanged between a woman and
fetus during pregnancy.”).
170. See Diana Bianchi, et al., Male Fetal Progenitor Cells Persist in Maternal Blood for
as Long as 27 Year Post Partum, 93 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 705 (1996);
“Microchimerism” is derived from the term “chimera” in Greek mythology. Catherine
Arcabascio, Chimeras: Double DNA Double the Fun for Crime Scene Investigators,
Prosecutors, and Defense Attorneys?, 40 AKRON L. REV. 435, 436–38 (2007); The Chimera
was the “offspring of Typohn and Echidna, and a sibling of the three-headed monster,
Cerberus. With parts of a lion, a goat, and a dragon, [she was] a powerful and hideous
beast.” David H. Kaye, Chimeric Criminals, 14 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 2–3 (2013);
According to Greek mythology, the Chimera was a “fearful creature, great and swift of foot
and strong, whose breath was flame unquenchable.” Catherine Arcabascio, Chimeras:
Double DNA Double the Fun for Crime Scene Investigators, Prosecutors, and Defense
Attorneys? 40 AKRON L. REV. 435, 437 (2007) (quoting EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY:
TIMELESS TALES OF GOD AND HEROES 139–43 (Warner Books 1999) (1942).
171. Arcabascio, supra note 170, at 438 (citing CHURCHILL’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (1989)).
172. Arcabascio, supra note 170, at 438.
173. Id. at 455–57.
174. Id. at 438.
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Maternal and fetal cells have been found to persist in the other’s body
under disparate conditions. Maternal cells have been discovered in the
second trimester in normal tissues of various fetal organs.175 Maternal cells
have also been found in the organs of newborns and infants with anomalies,
chromosomal abnormalities, and infections.176 Finally, maternal cells have
been found in children with and without autoimmune disease.177 Existence
of a mother’s cells in her offspring in many different circumstances, has led
researchers to conclude that while maternal cells are “frequently observed
in autoimmune diseases . . . it is evident that maternal cells can contribute
to the overall body architecture even in healthy individuals.”178
Similarly, fetal cells have been identified in mothers’ bodies long after
pregnancy ends. Fetal cells that travel into the mother’s body during
pregnancy persist inside of her, making her a chimera.179 Initial research
focused on the potential for persisting fetal microchimerism to sometimes
have adverse consequences for a mother.180 Specifically, researchers found
that fetal microchimerism associated positively with the autoimmune
disease scleroderma.181 But even in the first study, fetal microchimerism
was also found in healthy women. Over recent years multiple studies have
pointed to potential health benefits of fetal microchimerism, for example in
protection against some types of cancer, including breast cancer.182
Overall, researchers have determined that fetal cells can be both beneficial
and harmful to the mother:183
In most studies of cancer, the proposed role of fetal [cells] has been
beneficial, with a suggested role in tissue repair, repopulation
and/or immune surveillance.
However, a role in disease
progression has also been considered as contributing to
lymphangiogenesis or tumor growth, for example in melanoma.184

175. Nelson, supra note 170, at 421 (maternal cells were found in fetal thymus, lung,
heart, pancreas, liver, spleen, kidney, adrenal gland, ovary, testis, and brain).
176. Id. (maternal cells were found in newborn and infant thymus, lung, pancreas, liver,
spleen, thyroid, and skin).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Arcabascio, supra note 171, at 439; Chan, supra note 170, at 3 (describing that male
fetal cells persisted in the brain of his ninety-four year old mother). Microchimerism can also
be caused by miscarriage or induced abortion, it can be the result of cell transfer between
twins, and it is probable that a mother can pass the cells of an older sibling or a previous
pregnancy to a fetus during a subsequent pregnancy. Nelson, supra note 170, at 421.
180. Ralph P. Miech, Short Communication: The Role of Fetal Microchimerism in
Autoimmune Disease, 3(2) INT. J. CLIN. EXP. MED. 164, 165 (2010).
181. Id.
182. Nelson, supra note 170, at 425.
183. Id.; Stephanie Pritchard & Diana W. Bianchi, Fetal Cell Microchimerism in the
Maternal Hearth: Baby Gives Back, 110 CIRCULATION RESEARCH 3 (2012), available at
http://circres.ahajournals.org/content/110/1/3.full.pdf+html.
184. Nelson, supra note 169, at 425.
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Regarding microchimerism, there are still more questions than answers.
Nevertheless, it is now clear that the maternal-fetal connection is more
nuanced and longer lasting than previously thought.
Revelations concerning fetal and maternal microchimerism prompted
leading chimerism researcher J. Lee Nelson to the make the following
statement:
I think that we . . . need to revise the paradigm that we have, which
is mostly a paradigm of self-versus-other, because, biologically, it
is very likely that we all have chimerism at some level, usually
small levels. And the most common source of that is transfer of
cells between a mother and child during pregnancy.185
Nelson’s explanation of the biological basis for revising the selfversus-other paradigm has implications for the legal conceptualization of
pregnancy. Currently, the law conceptualizes pregnancy as an adversarial
relationship between two separate entities: mother and fetus. Nelson’s
research, and the research of others who study fetal-maternal
microchimerism, demonstrates that the mother-fetus relationship is more
than the relationship between two separate entities. The fact that mother
and fetus, in addition to the many other intertwined aspects of pregnancy,
also share each other’s cells, refutes an understanding of the mother and
fetus as, simply, separate.
E. MATERNAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF PREGNANCY
Understanding and acknowledging the many varied experiences of
pregnant women is critical to fairly characterizing pregnancy. As one
scholar noted, “only women can directly experience reproduction including
menstruation, pregnancy, birth, and lactation, so their voice and
perspectives on these issues are of central feminist concern.”186
Nevertheless, women’s voices have often been excluded from pregnancy
discourse. Philosopher Iris Marion Young commented that, “[w]e should
not be surprised to learn that discourse on pregnancy omits subjectivity, for
the specific experience of women has been absent from most of our
culture’s discourse about human experience and history.”187 Today,
185. Interview with J. Lee Nelson, Professor of Medicine, University of Washington
School of Medicine, Nelson Lab at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, in Seattle,
Wash. (Mar. 14, 2013) (on file with author).
186. Diana C. Parry, Women’s Lived Experiences With Pregnancy and Midwifery in a
Medicalized and Fetocentric Context: Six Short Stories, 12(3) QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 459
(2006) (citing L.R. WOLIVER, THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHIES OF PREGNANCY (2002)).
187. IRIS MARION YOUNG, ON FEMALE BODY EXPERIENCE: “THROWING LIKE A GIRL” AND
OTHER ESSAYS 46 (2005); see also ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS
EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 36 (1976) (“Nothing to be sure, has prepared me for the
intensity of relationship already existing between me and a creature I had carried in my
body and now held in my arms and fed from my breasts . . . . No one mentions the psychic
crisis of bearing a first child . . . the sense of confused power and powerlessness, of being
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pregnant women’s views are collected in memoirs, narratives, feminist
writings, and maternal studies research. Attention is given to the intimate
experiences of individual women and the social contexts which frame their
experiences. As “mother of modern feminism”188 Simone de Beauvior
noted, “[p]regnancy . . . [is] experienced in very different ways depending
on whether [it] takes place in revolt, resignation, satisfaction, or
enthusiasm.”189 Consistent with the effort to present women’s pregnancy
experiences in perspective, Canadian sociologist Diana C. Parry uses
pregnant women’s narratives to reveal “the social and cultural contexts of
women’s lived experiences with pregnancy through a feminist lens.”190
Poet Adrienne Rich and author Naomi Wolf offer their own memoirs of
pregnancy and motherhood in their books Of Woman Born191 and
Misconceptions, respectively.192 Psychiatrist Louann Brizendine uses her
clinical experience with pregnant women to provide maternal accounts of
pregnancy.193 Together, these portraits of pregnancy provide a helpful, yet
still incomplete, maternal perspective of pregnancy.194
Descriptions of women’s pregnancy experiences reveal pregnancy to
be a nuanced, often existentially altering experience.195 Women report
taken over on the one hand and of touching new physical and psychic potentialities on the
other, a heightened sensibility which can be exhilarating, bewildering, and exhausting. No
one mentions the strangeness of attraction—which can be as single-minded and
overwhelming as the early days of a love affair—to a being so tiny, so dependent, so foldedin to itself—who is, and yet is not, part of oneself.”).
188. FINEMAN, supra note 7 (citing DEIDRE BAIR, SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR: A BIOGRAPHY (1990)).
189. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 533 (Constance Borde & Sheila MalovanyChevallier, trans., Alfred A. Knopf 2010) (1949).
190. Parry, supra note 186, at 459.
191. RICH, supra note 187.
192. NAOMI WOLF, MISCONCEPTIONS: TRUTH, LIES, AND THE UNEXPECTED ON THE JOURNEY
TO MOTHERHOOD (2001).
193. BRIZENDINE, supra note 123.
194. The pregnancy narratives I provide are vulnerable to essentialist critique. Certainly,
they do not represent the experiences of all pregnant women. Nevertheless, they are
reflective of real pregnancy experiences that, at present, remain largely unrepresented in the
legal discourse surrounding pregnancy.
Similarly, Adrienne Rich laments the
incompleteness of her portrayal of motherhood: “I write with a painful consciousness of my
own Western cultural perspective and that of most of the sources available to me: painful
because it says so much about how female culture is fragmented by the male cultures,
boundaries, groupings in which women live. However, at this point any broad study of
female culture can be at best partial, and what any writer hopes-and knows-is that others like
her, with different training, background, and tools, are putting together other parts of this
immense half-buried mosaic in the shape of a woman’s face.” RICH, supra note 187, at 17;
For additional discussions of women’s pregnancy experiences see Priscilla J. Smith,
Responsibility for Life: How Abortion Serves Women’s Interests in Motherhood, 17 J.L. &
POL’Y 97 (2008) (providing women’s testimonies concerning their decisions to abort);
Khiara M. Bridges, When Pregnancy Is an Injury: Rape, Law, and Culture, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 457 (2013) (discussing both positive and negative constructions of pregnancy and
discussing women’s experiences with unwanted pregnancies).
195. See DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 189, at 538 (“But pregnancy is above all a drama
playing itself out in the woman between her and herself. She experiences it both as an
enrichment and a mutilation; the fetus is part of her body, and it is a parasite exploiting her;
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experiences of welcoming and resenting their pregnancies, loving and
fearing their unborn children, anticipating motherhood and longing for their
fleeting individuality.196 Though aspects of each woman’s experience
differ, ultimately the following accounts demonstrate that pregnancy is
often regarded as a unique relational existential reality simultaneously
representing duality and oneness.
The radical motherhood theories introduced by Adrienne Rich in Of
Woman Born are grounded in her own experiences as a mother.197 She
presents pregnancy as a duality while simultaneously acknowledging that
aspects of oneness and pre-pregnancy individuality persist:
Nor, in pregnancy, did I experience the embryo as decisively
internal in Freud’s terms, but rather, as something inside and of
me, yet becoming hourly and daily more separate, on its way to
becoming separate from me and of-itself. In early pregnancy the
stirring of the fetus felt like ghostly tremors of my own body, later
like the movements of a being imprisoned in me; but both
sensations were my sensations, contributing to my own sense of
physical and psychic space.198
Rich’s testimony that pregnancy represents both duality and oneness
resonates with other women as well. Philosopher Iris Marion Young
describes her experience:
As my pregnancy begins, I experience it as a change in my body. . . .
Then I feel a tickle, a little gurgle in my belly. It is my feeling, my
insides, and it feels somewhat like a gas bubble, but it is not; it is
different, in another place, belonging to another, another that is
nevertheless my body. . . . Pregnancy challenges the integration of
my body experience by rendering fluid the boundary between what
is within, myself, and what is outside, separate. I experience my
insides as the space of another, yet my own body199
In The Second Sex, pregnancy is described in similar terms:
She experiences it both as an enrichment and a mutilation; the fetus
is part of her body, and it is a parasite exploiting her; she possesses
it, and she is possessed by it; it encapsulates the whole future, and in

she possesses it, and she is possessed by it; . . . A new existence is going to manifest and
justify her own existence. . . .”). See also WOLF, supra note 192, at 30 (“What was this new
life—new life form? The weirdness was intense. . . . There was someone in me; nurturing
itself from me; what was the difference between this inner inhabitation and a kind of benign
possession, or gentle succubus?”).
196. DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 189, at 538–39.
197. RICH, supra note 187, at 17.
198. Id. at 47.
199. IRIS MARION YOUNG, Pregnant Embodiment: Subjectivity and Alienation, in ON
FEMALE BODY EXPERIENCE 46, 49 (2005).
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carrying it, she feels as vast as the world; but his very richness
annihilates her, she has the impression of not being anything else.200
The diary entry of a European woman similarly expresses feelings of
simultaneous duality and oneness during pregnancy:
I am a cold and logical thinker, but at that time, my reasoning
blurred and dissolved, impotent, into tears, another helpless, childish
creature’s tears, not mine. I was one and the other at once. It stirred
inside of me. Could I control its movements with my will?
Sometimes I thought I could, at other times I realized it was beyond
my control. I couldn’t control anything. I was not myself. And not
for a brief, passing moment of rapture, which men, too, experience,
but for nine watchful quiet months. . . . Then it was born. I heard it
scream with a voice that was no longer mine.201
While the writer shrinks from feelings of powerlessness and invasion, she
continues to feel that she was “one and the other at once.”202 Narratives
provided by Sociologist Diana C. Parry shed further light on how women
view their pregnancies. In the context of pregnancy healthcare decisions,
some women report feeling pressure to sacrifice their individual needs.203
These accounts provide support for the dual nature of pregnancy,
specifically, the extent to which these women crave recognition as
individual pregnant women, not just as incubators.
For example, one woman expresses her frustration at the severe
morning sickness she is experiencing. Her pregnancy is making her “feel
sick all day and all night,” causing her to miss two weeks of work,
preventing her from doing any of the things she normally enjoys, making it
difficult for her to “sleep, eat, and function,” and is affecting her mood.204
She feels helpless and hopeless. Against the advice of her family, she
decides to take Diclectin205 to help with her pregnancy. She speaks with
her midwife, Joy, to weigh the costs and benefits of taking the medicine:
This drug has been around for years and I have talked to a lot of
other women about it. Everything suggests it is safe. Plus, Joy
really thought it would help me. She put it to me like this: If
you’re not coping well with this pregnancy—for example, if you’re
sick all the time and you’re worn out and you’re stressed out—then
200. DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 189, at 538.
201. RICH, supra note 187, at 167 (quoting ELIZABETH MANN BORGESE, THE ASCENT OF
WOMAN 44 (1963)).
202. Id.
203. See Parry, supra note 186.
204. Parry, supra note 186, at 465.
205. Diclectin is prescription medication used to treat nausea and vomiting during
pregnancy. Diclectin, DUCHESNAY, http://www.duchesnay.com/en/diclectin (last visited
Feb. 18, 2015).
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you’re not going to have a healthy pregnancy. Joy explained to me
that not getting enough rest or being nauseated all the time will
affect the baby. According to Joy, even your state of mind, your
mental state of mind, is important for a healthy pregnancy. I now
understand that a healthy mom is important, too.206
In justifying her choice to her family, she provides a glimpse into her
difficult pregnancy with the following plea:
[R]ight now, I just feel like everything is overwhelming me and I
just lie in bed in the dark. It’s hard to explain, but I just feel so
overwhelmed by the nausea, which leads to feelings of regret like,
maybe this wasn’t the best decision to get pregnant. . . . [T]his is a
hard decision for me to make. I don’t like the idea of taking
medication while pregnant either, but you know what?! This is too
much; I can’t handle this any more. I need to do something to stop
this nausea and help myself. I appreciate your concern for the
baby, but this is also about me. I need to feel better.207
The following account further exemplifies the social conflict women
encounter when seeking healthcare during pregnancy. They feel that
doctors are treating their pregnancies, not their whole person. At times,
pregnant women feel neglected. One woman explains that her decision to
have a midwife attend her home birth, instead of using an obstetrician in a
hospital, is based on her desire to be treated as an individual pregnant
woman, not just as a pregnancy:
[M]idwifery is woman-centered care. That is, midwives provide
individualistic care that is catered to an individual woman and her
unique situation. As a consequence, my midwives treated me as a
whole person, not simply as a pregnancy. Part of the individualized
care was the informed choice and shared decision making that
midwifery allowed me. Midwives encourage women to take an
active role in their own health and well-being, including the power to
make decisions.208
Obstetric care is criticized for similar reasons. Young explains:
[T]he pregnant subject’s encounter with obstetrical medicine in the
United States often alienates her from her pregnant and birthing
experience. . . . I will argue that a woman’s experience in pregnancy
and birthing is often alienated because her condition tends to be
defined as a disorder, because medical instruments objectify internal
processes in such a way that they devalue a woman’s experience of
206. Parry, supra note 186, at 466.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 463.
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those processes, and because the social relations and instrumentation
of the medical setting reduce her control over her experience.209
Overall, these perspectives portray pregnancy as an existence in which
duality and oneness are experienced simultaneously. Even while she
repels, she welcomes. Even while she resents, she celebrates. Even while
she hates, she loves. Pregnancy is uniquely situated to encompass the one
and the two.
It is important to clarify that the simultaneous duality and oneness of
pregnancy applies to the physiological, existential, and social relationship
between the mother and fetus. Physiologically, duality is represented by
fetal viability and by health conflicts between mother and fetus.
Simultaneously, physiological oneness is represented by the intertwined
existence of the mother and fetus, their shared resources, and
microchimerism. Existential duality is demonstrated where women feel
that they are two. Simultaneously, existential oneness is represented by
women’s expressions of viewing the pregnancy as part of their selves.
Finally, social duality is experienced by pregnant women’s feelings of
being invaded by an other or their resentment that concern for the fetus
overshadows concern for their individual self. Simultaneously, social
oneness is experienced when they welcome and absorb the otherness
represented by the fetus.
The preceding narratives and memoirs serve to show that women are
recorded as experiencing pregnancy as duality and oneness. They feel
connected to their pregnancies and to the lives growing inside of them, yet
they also feel invaded. Outside of pregnancy and the mother-infant
relationship, there are few moments that prompt individuals to feel that
they are, simultaneously, one and two. It is important that this more
representative perspective, rather than the adversarial view of pregnancy
that has evolved over time, be relied upon to guide the legal understanding
of and interaction with pregnancy.
F. A HOLISTIC VIEW AND FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
The definition of pregnancy that I propose serve as the foundation for a
legal conceptualization is that pregnancy is a unique relational existential
reality that simultaneously represents duality and oneness. The law should
treat the pregnant woman as a pregnant woman, not as an individual person
like any other non-pregnant person, not as the embodiment of two separate
individuals, but as a pregnant woman.210 She is more than one but less than
209. IRIS MARION YOUNG, ON FEMALE BODY EXPERIENCE: “THROWING LIKE A GIRL” AND
OTHER ESSAYS 55–56 (2005) (a discussion of pregnant women’s experiences with medical care).
210. The Supreme Court recently considered how to conceptualize pregnancy in the
context of employment discrimination. See supra, note 13. Some argue in support of
viewing pregnancy as disability. Brief of Law for Professors and Women’s Rights
Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 28, Young v. United Parcel Serv.,
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two. She embodies and represents an inseparable woman and fetus. The
fact that medical science has enabled us to cut open the pregnant woman’s
belly and remove the child from within does not change the inherent nature
of the pregnancy. It does not transform the pregnant woman into a
separable mother and fetus. I propose the adoption of a view that
incorporates all aspects of pregnancy, the harmonious as well as the
conflicting, the duality as well as the oneness, the separate as well as the
connected. A holistic view of pregnancy understands that pregnancy is a
unique relational existential reality that simultaneously represents
physiological, existential, and social duality and oneness. This view is
consistent with both physiological and maternal understandings of
pregnancy. It is reflective of both intended and unintended pregnancies. It
is honest. And, it is woman-centered.211
This holistic view incorporates the caring and nurturing aspects of
pregnancy consistent with perspectives of relational feminists who
highlight the care aspects of women’s relationships.212 It is also aligned
with the radical feminist rejection of patriarchal constructs, their focus on
motherhood, and the argument that “androgeny is not liberating for
women” and that feminist goals should include revaluing traits “associated
with the feminine role, such as nurturing and gentleness.”213 A holistic
view of pregnancy stands in stark contrast with patriarchal views of
pregnancy: It characterizes pregnancy from the perspectives of women and
an ethic of care, and it celebrates the unique perspective that women offer.
Though a holistic view will likely find support among radical and relational
feminists, it should not alarm liberal feminists. In this section, I situate my
holistic theory of pregnancy within relational and radical feminism and I
respond to the concerns I anticipate it will raise among liberal feminists.214
Inc., No. 12-1226, (U.S. Sep. 10, 2014), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/
239318619/Young-v-UPS-Supreme-Court-Brief; see also Mary Ann Mason, Motherhood v.
Equal Treatment, 29 J. FAM. L. 1, 45–49 (1990/91) (arguing that conceptualizing pregnancy
as disability is a mistake).
211. See Mason, supra note 210, at 2 (“Maternity and motherhood are seen as treacherous
topics by those seeking rights for women. They believe that to recognize the biological and
social conditions of childbearing and childrearing as a feminine characteristic is to open the
door to classifying women for separate, unequal treatment under the law.”). See also, June
Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Behavioral Biology, the Rational Actor Model, and the New
Feminist Agenda, 24 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: LAW AND ECONOMICS: TOWARD
SOCIAL JUSTICE 189 (Dana L. Gold ed., 2009) (“It is impossible to discuss biology without
considering gender . . . . While we believe that the new biology distinguishes between
differences in observed preferences and differences in fundamental capacity, we also believe
that the multiple risks that come from stereotyping are real. While we cannot let the threat
of stereotyping affect our acquisition of knowledge, we must acknowledge and confront it.”)
212. Hendricks, Body and Soul, supra note 90, at 365.
213. PATRICIA SMITH, ed., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 5 (1993).
214. Liberal feminists espouse the general view that “the subordination of women is caused
by the legal and social barriers that block or preclude their access to the public sphere of
economic and political life.” Patricia Smith, Introduction: Feminist Jurisprudence and the
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In her seminal 1989 article Jurisprudence and Gender, Robin West
critiqued the jurisprudential embrace of the “separation thesis” consisting
of the following cluster of claims or assumptions:
[T]he claim that human beings are, definitionally, distinct from one
another, the claim that the referent of “I” is singular and
unambiguous, the claim that the word “individual” has an
uncontested biological meaning, namely that we are each
physically individuated from every other, the claim that we are
individuals “first,” and the claim that what separates us is
epistemologically and morally prior to what connects us.215
West maintains that reliance on the separation thesis and its view of the
individual as a fully separate being is a foundational flaw in legal thinking
that disregards aspects of women’s lives.216 She argues that “[w]omen are
not essentially, necessarily, inevitably, invariably, always, and forever
separate from other human beings. . . .”217 Unlike men, West argues,
women’s lives are often defined by their connection to others. West
identifies four “recurrent and critical material experiences” during which
“women are in some sense ‘connected’ to life and to other human
Chief among them, she identifies “the experience of
beings.”218
pregnancy.”219

Nature of Law, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 3, 4 (Patricia Smith, ed., 1993). Liberal feminists
argued for “equal rights and equal freedom” and felt that the law should be “gender blind, that
there should be no special restrictions or special assistance on the basis of sex.” Id. Radical
feminists believe that we must “change the way we think about gender itself, [and] reexamine
our assumptions about our nature and relations to others.” Id. at 5. Many assert that “male
power or male dominance is the basis of the construction of gender and that this construction
pervades all other institutions and ensures the perpetuation of patriarchy and thus the
subordination of women.” Id. In general, “the focus of radical feminism is on the domination
of women by men through the social construction of gender within patriarchy. For them the
solution to the oppression of women is to reverse institutional structures of domination and to
reconstruct gender, thereby eliminating patriarchy.” Id. Relational feminists posit that men
and women are, in fact, fundamentally different because “men and women typically undergo a
different moral development.” Id. at 7. Many relational feminists argue that feminists today
should not seek “to fit women into a man’s world, not to assimilate women into patriarchy, and
not to prove that women can function like men and meet male norms[.]” Id. Instead of
assuming that women will change to meet existing institutions, “institutions should be changed
to accommodate women.” Id.
215. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988).
216. Id. at 1.
217. Id. at 2.
218. Id. at 2–3. West identified the following four connected experiences of women’s
lives: “the experience of pregnancy itself; the invasive and ‘connecting’ experience of
heterosexual penetration, which may lead to pregnancy; the monthly experience of
menstruation, which represents the potential for pregnancy; and the post-pregnancy
experience of breast-feeding.” Id. at 3.
219. Id.
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West’s critique followed the work of earlier feminists. In 1989,
sociologist Barbara Katz Rothman lashed out against the “absurdity” of the
atomistic individual:220 “Motherhood is an experience of interpersonal
connection. The isolated, atomistic individual is an absurdity when one is
pregnant: one is two, two are one.”221 Poet Adrienne Rich examined the
disconnect between women’s connected understandings of pregnancy and
motherhood, and the normative views of pregnancy espoused by our social
institutions.222 She critiqued the patriarchal constructions of pregnancy and
motherhood and revealed how motherhood norms were created by outside
observers, gendered male.223 Throughout her work, she refuted the
ideology of motherhood by presenting thorough research as well as her
own perspective.224
The perspectives of Rich, Rothman, and West, that pregnancy is a
unique relational experience, and not simply the embodiment of two
separate beings, is consistent with relational feminists’ focus on the care
aspects of pregnancy, that
pregnancy and birth are occasions of heightened connection to
another life. . . . [P]regnancy is an act of nurturance: the feeding and
care of a developing life. That nurturing may be done willingly or
unwillingly, with love, indifference or hate, but it is done. . . .225
Relational feminists highlight both the nurturing and connected aspects
of pregnancy and mothering.226 They value the connection between mother
and fetus and view it as a uniquely feminine strength. Further, they use
care to help define relationships and argue that it should be a basis for legal
recognition of relational rights.227 Meanwhile, relational feminists
recognize that pregnancy can elicit seemingly contradictory responses. The
above quote demonstrates the idea that a pregnant woman will care for her
fetus physiologically, regardless of whether she consciously loves, hates,
welcomes, or resents the life growing inside of her.
220. See generally ROTHMAN, supra note 118, at 30–37.
221. ROTHMAN, supra note 118, at 89.
222. RICH, supra note 187.
223. Id. at 11 (“In the division of labor according to gender, the makers and sayers of
culture, the namers, have been the sons of the mothers.”); see also id. at 39 (“The female
body . . . has far more radical implications than we have yet come to appreciate. Patriarchal
thought has limited female biology to its own narrow specifications. The feminist vision
has recoiled from female biology for these reasons; it will, I believe, come to view our
physicality as a resource, rather than a destiny.”)
224. See generally id.
225. Hendricks, Body and Soul, supra note 90, at 365.
226. Id.; See Linda McClain, “Atomistic Man” Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1184 (1992);
227. See Jennifer Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429,
442–43 (2007). For an argument that mothering should be “unsexed” see Daren
Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 57, 68–69 (2012).

Summer 2015]

HOLISTIC PREGNANCY

245

Not all feminist theorists embrace a connected view of pregnancy.228
Martha Nussbaum, in a 2008 essay, responded to West’s articulation of
pregnancy as connected by defending the separation thesis:
The physical separateness thesis is both true and important. . . .
Pregnancy is, of course, a partial exception to the physical
separateness thesis, since the mother’s nutrition does nourish the fetus.
Moreover, her emotional state may affect the well-being of the fetus,
so pregnancy may be an exception to the mental separateness thesis as
well. Notice, however, that the exception is a one-way exception:
there is nothing the fetus is capable of doing that will improve the
nutritional status or the emotional state of the mother. The fetus is in
that sense a parasite. Moreover, there are many ways in which the
thesis of bodily connection breaks down. . . . All sorts of grave
medical choices often have to be made between the physical interests
of the mother and those of her fetus, and in such cases nobody has
much doubt that there are two separate beings in question, however
close and intimate their physical connection.229
Nussbaum rejects West’s overall separation thesis critique as well as its
applicability to pregnancy. Her view is representative of the liberal
feminist position. Liberal feminists avoid highlighting any differences
between men and women and instead focus on attaining feminist goals
through equal opportunity for all.230
Recognizing differences is
discouraged because it is believed that many differences are socially
constructed and because there is concern that differences will be exploited
to further oppress women.231
To refute West’s pregnancy critique, Nussbaum focuses on aspects of
pregnancy that highlight separations between the mother and fetus and
argues that these examples of separation prove that, though connected,

228. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender: Defending a Radical
Liberalism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 985 (2008); see also Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 375, 383–85 (1996). More recently, gender theorist Daren Rosenblum argued
that biology plays an outsized role in the construction of “mothers” and “fathers” and claimed
that ovulation, gestation/birth, and lactation are not necessarily connected to mothering.
Rosenblum, supra note 227, at 68–69; see also Hendricks, Body and Soul, supra note 90, at
364–65 (Scholars “have warned of the dangers of relational and other feminist theories that
emphasize women’s connectedness to others. Feminist theory that portrays women as
inherently more nurturing than men can easily be used against feminist political goals”).
229. Nussbaum, supra note 228, at 988–89 (emphasis added).
230. See SMITH, supra note 213, at 4–5.
231. Id.; Hendricks, Body and Soul, supra note 90, at 364–65 (Scholars “have warned of
the dangers of relational and other feminist theories that emphasize women’s connectedness
to others. Feminist theory that portrays women as inherently more nurturing than men can
easily be used against feminist political goals”).
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mother and fetus are separate beings.232 Her view correlates with liberal
feminist ideology that views women’s equality through the lens of
individual human rights and necessarily rejects any view of women that
conflicts with an individualistic pursuit of equality.233 Nussbaum’s defense
of the separation thesis seeks to invalidate West’s claim by proving two
counter-assertions: (1) pregnancy, as a matter of biology, is consistent with
the separation thesis because the maternal-fetal connection is a one-way
relationship wherein the mother gives and the fetus takes and health
conflicts may pit the interests of the mother against those of the fetus;234
and (2) acceptance of the separation thesis is necessary to the achievement
of women’s equality.235
Despite their valid aspects, these arguments have weaknesses. First, as
was previously discussed, from a physiological perspective, pregnancy is
not simply a one-way relationship. Pregnancy research reveals that
physiologically, pregnancy has an inherently interconnected nature.236
Well-known findings concerning the delicate physical entanglement of
mother and fetus support this view.237 Moreover, medical conflicts that
232. See Sanger, supra note 228, at 383–85 (expressing concern that “uncritical
celebration and extension” of the views of relational feminists like Gilligan and West will
justify discrimination against women).
233. See SMITH, supra note 213, at 4. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed her concern
that focus on the mother-child relationship will lead to more discrimination against mothers:
“Historically, denial or curtailment of women’s employment opportunities has been
traceable directly to the pervasive presumption that women are mothers first, and workers
second. This prevailing ideology about women’s roles has in turn justified discrimination
against women when they are mothers or mothers-to-be.” Coleman v. Court of Appeals of
Maryland, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 1343 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting 1989 House
Hearing 248 (American Bar Association Background Report)). Concerns regarding how
increased attention to the mother-child relationship will set women back persists outside of
the legal academy as well. Child psychologist, Dr. Stella Chess warned of the dangers of
giving too much attention to the mother-child relationship:
We are back to the professional ideology of the 1950s and 1960s, by now
fortunately outmoded, in which the causation of all psychopathology, from
simple behavior problems to juvenile delinquency to schizophrenia itself,
was blamed on the mother. Then the mother’s fault lay in her noxious
actions during her child’s first few years of life and the attitudes, both
conscious and unconscious, that determined them—emotional rejection,
rigid childcare practices, ‘double-din’ messages, etc. Now the fault lies in
what the mother fails to do, namely failure to establish skin-to-skin contact
with her baby. Further, the time of danger has now been moved back to the
first few hours, or enlarged to the first few weeks after birth.
Stella Chess, Mothers Are Always the Problem – or Are They? Old Wine in New Bottles, 71
PEDIATRICS 974 (1983).
234. Nussbaum, supra note 228, at 989.
235. Id., at 991 (“The separation thesis is true and important. All the types of connection
that we seek with one another are mediated by our separateness, physical and mental.
Forgetting this fact may actually harm our projects of connection.”)
236. See supra section II.A., p. 229; section II.D., p. 233.
237. Id.
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may accompany a pregnancy do not necessarily lead to classification of all
In most
pregnancies as consistent with the separation thesis.238
pregnancies, there is no need to choose between the health of the mother
and the fetus. Medical conflicts during pregnancy that prompt a woman to
terminate or risk her pregnancy in the interest of the woman’s health are
extremely rare.239 The occurrence of medical conflict in pregnancy,
supporting the separate thesis, is the exception. A state of physiological
harmony, supporting West’s connected view, is the norm. It is therefore
more reasonable to develop a conceptualization of pregnancy based
primarily on the norm of physiological harmony, while also incorporating
the exception of medical conflict. A holistic view of pregnancy
accomplishes this goal.
Moreover, even where there is a medical conflict, some mothers deny
the physiological conflict by making the social choice to continue the
pregnancy. In doing so, they refuse to choose between their individual self
and their pregnant self.240 They instead choose both as components of their
whole self, and their continued relationship with their fetus. In these
scenarios, medical conflict does not fully prove the separateness of mother
and fetus. While medical conflict demonstrates physiological conflict, a
choice to continue the pregnancy, in spite of the threat to maternal health,
demonstrates social connection. Where, in the face of physiological
conflict, the mother continues her pregnancy, a holistic view of pregnancy
is representative. A holistic view captures the physiological conflict, by
recognizing pregnancy’s inherent duality while also incorporating social
connection by recognizing pregnancy’s inherent oneness. Moreover, when
the mother chooses to continue her pregnancy over a termination that
would be, arguably, in her individual interest, the mother proves that the

238. See supra section II.B., p. 231.
239. It is difficult to find reliable statistics on the percentage of abortions that are chosen
to protect maternal health. It seems that between less than one percent and 2.8 percent of all
abortions are performed to save the life of the mother or for the health of the mother.
Akinrinola Bankole, Susheela Singh, & Taylor Hasa, Reasons Why Women Have Induced
Abortions: Evidence from 27 Countries, 24 INT’L FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES (1998),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/2411798.html; Reproductive Health, Maternal
and Infant Health: Pregnancy-Related Deaths, CDC (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/
reproductivehealth/MaternalInfantHealth/Pregnancy-relatedMortality.htm. However, over
1000 women die each year for pregnancy-related reasons and it is believed that many more
would die if abortion was not legal. Id. See also Priscilla J. Smith, Responsibility for Life:
How Abortion Serves Women’s Interests in Motherhood, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 97, 103–25 (2008)
(providing a thorough discussion of when and why women obtain abortions).
240. Erika Bachiochi, Embodied Equality: Debunking Equal Protection Arguments for
Abortion, 34 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 889 (2011). Bachiochi challenges “the assumptions
underlying the idea that pregnancy and motherhood necessarily undermine equality for
women [and argues] instead that abortion rights actually hinder the equality of women by
taking the wombless male body as normative, thereby promoting cultural hostility toward
pregnancy and motherhood.” Id. at 893.
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social relationship between herself and her fetus is characterized by
connection, protection, and care.
In addition to defending the separation thesis from a theoretical
perspective, Nussbaum also expresses a practical concern that the
separation thesis is necessary to protect women’s equality.241 Recognition
of the connected nature of pregnancy can be equally protective of women’s
equality. As this article’s review of pregnancy law in Part III will show,
courts have little difficulty interfering with women’s autonomy and actions
when applying an adversarial view of pregnancy. This is because the
adversarial view compels courts to balance the rights of the woman against
the potentially adversarial interests of the fetus.242 This balancing of rights,
which would not exist were the woman not pregnant, enables courts to
intervene in women’s pregnancies. Though some courts that adopt a
connected view of pregnancy also impose state action upon pregnant
women, a connected view is theoretically less consistent with an
adversarial view of pregnancy.243 Adopting a legal conceptualization of
pregnancy that recognizes the connection between mother and fetus would
require the formulation of a legal framework that appreciates the otherness
of pregnancy. Neither the current adversarial model nor a purely
individualistic approach to the pregnant woman recognizes the true nature
of pregnancy. Despite Nussbaum’s concerns, I believe that there is no
reason to assume that this holistic conceptualization of pregnancy would be
less protective of women’s equality.244 Similarly, activist and lawyer Erika
Bachiochi argues that “the assumptions underlying the idea that pregnancy
and motherhood necessarily undermine equality for women . . . actually
hinder the equality of women by taking the wombless male body as
241. Nussbaum, supra note 228, at 989–90 (expressing her concern as follows: “It seems
to me that West romanticizes the state of pregnancy when she fails to observe these manifest
tensions and breakdowns in physical connection. Moreover, when we consider the case of
pregnancy due to rape or incest, or pregnancy as the result of inadequate opportunity to use
contraception, the separateness thesis looks stronger yet: this is my body, and here I find
within it an unwanted parasite, jeopardizing my plans and possibly my health and even my
life. If it this picture that underlies most arguments in favor of abortion rights for women,
and any feminist ignores such considerations at her peril.”).
242. Rebecca Rausch argues that there is validity to the adversarial conception of
pregnancy: “It seems untenable that any abortion rights analysis can truly avoid this clash.
The interests of a fetus and a woman who does not want to be pregnant necessarily
conflict.” Rebecca Rausch, Reframing Roe: Property Over Privacy, 27 BERKELEY J.
GENDER L. & JUST. 28, 52 (2012).
243. See Raleigh Fitkin-Pal Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964);
see infra section III.A., p. 250.
244. In subsequent articles, I will provide greater detail as to how the law should interact
with pregnancy in specific cases. This foundational article seeks to show that the current
conceptualization is inconsistent with the true nature of pregnancy and that the legal
conceptualization of pregnancy should be reconstructed to reflect maternal and scientific
understandings.
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normative, thereby promoting cultural hostility toward pregnancy and
motherhood.”245
I argue that feminist goals of social and economic equality would be
better supported by a theorization of pregnancy that is honest and realistic.
A few decades ago women were forced to minimize the impact that
pregnancy, motherhood, and marriage had on their ability to be successful
in the paid market.246 To admit the severity of morning sickness and its
impact on productivity at work, or the pain of sleepless nights and the
effect on brain function, or the amount of time spent on housework and the
consequential lack of energy for other pursuits, would have been the death
knell of maternal employment.247 With the formal barriers to women’s
equal participation in the public sphere eradicated, thanks to the work of
liberal feminists, the new feminist equality frontier should be to create a
society wherein all women are able to fully participate and succeed in the
public sphere, without sacrificing motherhood.248 Therefore, unless we are
honest about the meaning and impact of pregnancy and motherhood on the
lives of women, we will be unable to eradicate the mothering effect and

245. Bachiochi, supra note 240, at 893; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND
DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987).
246. See Mary Ann Mason, Motherhood v. Equal Treatment, 29 J. FAM. L. 1 (1990/91)
(arguing that an equal protection analysis of maternity and childrearing is bad for women
and children).
247. In her book, PREGNANT MEN, Professor Ruth Colker admits to her own difficulties
working during pregnancy and notes that pretending that a pregnant woman is no different
from anyone else, or from her pre-pregnant self, is problematic:
My pregnancy made me so tired that I often found it difficult to continue
with my practice of law. Despite my feminism, I felt guilty in putting my
own physical needs above my professional practice. I confided in a
colleague that I was frustrated that people had expected me to work so hard
during my pregnancy. She said in response, “Did you ever try telling them
that you are tired? You always walk around telling people how good you
feel and then you are surprised when they don’t empathize with your
exhaustion!”
RUTH COLKER, PREGNANT MEN 5 (1994). In her memoir, Naomi Wolf shares a similar
realization, “There is an impossible expectation placed on pregnant women in our society:
that we’re supposed to get on with everything and express only a blossoming sense of joy
and anticipation, even as the person we have taught ourselves to be is transfigured and
reborn.” WOLF, supra note 192, at 63.
248. See FINEMAN, supra note 7, at 70–89; see also id. at 70–71 (discussing potential
disadvantages to pushing for the de-gendering of motherhood: “To a great extent, the law
and legal language incorporate the feminist notion that Mother is an institution that must be
reformed–that is, contained and neutralized. In middle-class family law (the law of
marriage and divorce), this has been accomplished by transfiguring the symbolically
positive cultural and social components of parenting typically associated with the institution
of motherhood into the de-gendered components of the neutered institution of ‘parenthood.’
Custody policy at divorce reflects the determination that parents are assumed equally
entitled to custody regardless of the ‘mothering’ they did (or did not do) during the
marriage.”); Bachiochi, supra note 240.
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achieve success as both mothers and workers.249 Adopting a legal
conceptualization of pregnancy that reflects a holistic view of pregnancy is
an important step toward achieving these goals.
Finally, a holistic view of pregnancy will produce more just legal
results. Strapping a pregnant woman down and forcing her to undergo a
cesarean section against her wishes is not the type of state action expected
from a liberal democracy,250 terminating a mothers’ parental rights based
solely on her misconduct during pregnancy is not good for mothers,
children, or families,251 and charging a woman with murder because
desperation led her to attempt suicide while she happened to be pregnant
represents an utter failure to understand mental illness and vulnerability.252
A holistic view of pregnancy would empower pregnant women to make
choices that are best for themselves and their pregnancies. By adopting a
holistic view of pregnancy and abandoning the farce of adversarial
pregnancy, the law can move toward practices that will enhance the lives of
mothers, children, and families.
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that the separation thesis
remains of value to pregnancy theory. In other words, the separateness of
woman and fetus is an accurate portrayal of some aspects of pregnancy
under certain circumstances. Separation is represented by medical and
social conflicts between the mother and the fetus that may arise. A holistic
view of pregnancy, necessarily, must incorporate these aspects of
pregnancy. It does so by recognizing that duality is a critical aspect of
pregnancy. Thus, within the feminist legal discourse, my perspective is
more aligned with West’s view than with Nussbaum’s, yet it incorporates
both. I side with West and other relational feminists because I believe the
connected view is more reflective of the nature of pregnancy than the
liberal separationist view. Nevertheless, I do not discount the valid aspects
of Nussbaum’s separation thesis defense. Rather, I merge both the separate
and connected aspects of pregnancy into one holistic conceptualization.
Accordingly, I propose the rejection of the adversarial view of pregnancy
and the adoption of a holistic view of pregnancy in its place. The law should
conceptualize pregnancy as a unique relational existential reality that
simultaneously represents duality and oneness. Further, the law should adopt
a presumption in favor of maternal decision making during pregnancy. The
presumption in all wanted pregnancies should be that the pregnant woman
acts in the best interests of herself, her pregnancy and her fetus.253
249. See generally Rona Kaufman Kitchen, Eradicating the Mothering Effect: Women as
Workers and Mothers, Successfully and Simultaneously, 26 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 167
(2011) (defining the “mothering effect” as the comprehensive aspects of the professional
and personal marginalization and financial penalization of mothers).
250. See infra section III.A., p. 250.
251. See infra section III.B., p. 259.
252. See infra section III.B., p. 259.
253. In a subsequent article, I will discuss how the presumption can be overcome.
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PART III. CONSEQUENCES OF AN ADVERSARIAL VIEW
The consequences of applying the adversarial view of pregnancy in
the context of wanted pregnancies are troubling for women, children, and
families. Courts hearing cases concerning medical intervention, criminal
allegations, and parental rights have been using an adversarial view of
pregnancy to guide their decisions. As a result, pregnant women have been
physically violated, families have been ripped apart, mothers have been
denied access to their children, and women have been incarcerated after the
deaths of their babies. This section discusses specific cases that illustrate
the unjust results of applying an adversarial conceptualization of pregnancy
to wanted pregnancies. In addition, I describe how a holistic view of
pregnancy and a presumption in favor of maternal decision making during
pregnancy would lead to more just results.
A. MEDICAL INTERVENTION
In In re A.C., a court in Washington, D.C. was called upon to
determine whether to authorize a hospital to deliver a twenty-six and a half
week old fetus from her terminally ill mother, Angela Carder, by cesarean
section without her consent.254 Due to Angela’s advanced illness and her
inability to clearly communicate her will, the trial court found that “[t]here
was some dispute about whether [Angela] would have chosen to have a
cesarean section” at earlier than twenty-eight weeks.255 Angela’s husband
and mother were opposed to the cesarean section.256 Some hospital doctors
testified that the procedure was necessary to protect the unborn child and
that if performed, the child had a fifty percent to sixty percent chance of
survival.257 The District Court authorized the cesarean section.258
After Angela was informed of the trial court’s decision but before the
cesarean section was performed, Angela refused to consent to the surgery.
In response to a physician’s inquiry, she “mouthed the words, ‘I don’t want
it done.’”259 As a result, an appeal was filed.260 The Court of Appeals
denied a motion to stay the order of the trial court. The hospital performed
the cesarean section and both the mother and infant died.261
After the procedure was performed, a three-judge motion division of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia prepared an
opinion denying the stay.262 In its decision the court applied the adversarial
view of pregnancy adopted in Roe.263 In reaching its conclusion, the court
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1239 (D.C. 1990).
In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 612 (D.C. 1987).
In re A.C., 573 A.2d. at 1240.
Id. at 1239.
Id. at 1241.
Id.
In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 613.
Id.
Id. at 612, vacated 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988).
Id. at 614–15 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 160, 162 (1973)).
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considered the Roe framework for balancing maternal and fetal rights, the
pregnant woman’s right to bodily integrity, and a mother’s right to
withhold medical treatment from her child.264 Based on Roe, the court
explained that in a case such as this it was proper to balance a pregnant
woman’s right to liberty against the State’s interest in potential life:
[A]s a matter of law, the right of a woman to an abortion is
different and distinct from her obligations to the fetus once she has
decided not to timely terminate her pregnancy. With a viable fetus,
a balancing of interests must replace the single interest of the
mother. . . .265
In affirming the trial court’s decision, the court also considered
whether the pregnant woman’s right to bodily integrity precluded it from
authorizing the cesarean section without her consent. In analyzing the
matter, the court noted that though the “right to bodily integrity precludes
the State from intervening in the adult’s decision to refuse medical
treatment,” the State’s interests in “protecting innocent third parties,” in
this case the fetus, “may override” the adult’s right.266 Finally, the court
considered whether a parent could refuse medical treatment on behalf of
her child. While the law clearly supports the proposition that “parents may
not withhold life-saving treatment from their children because of the
parents’ religious beliefs,” the court recognized that this rule was not
necessarily applicable to unborn children.267 Thus, the court turned its
attention to the question of whether a pregnant woman’s right to bodily
integrity outweighed the State’s interest in potential life.268 Based on
decisions in other jurisdictions, the court determined that “the State may
not infringe upon the mother’s right to bodily integrity to protect the life or
health of her unborn child unless to do so will not significantly affect the
health of the mother and unless the child has a significant chance of being
born alive.”269 Finally, the court held that where, as here, the pregnant
woman had only a few days left to live, the cesarean section would not

264. In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 614–15.
265. Id. The argument that a woman’s legal rights and duties shift once she has decided
against terminating the pregnancy was made earlier by fetal rights proponent John A.
Robertson. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 437–38 (1983) (claiming that “[o]nce [the
pregnant woman] decides to forgo abortion and the state chooses to protect the fetus, the
woman loses the liberty to act in ways that would adversely affect the fetus. [¶].
Restrictions on pregnancy management may significantly limit a woman’s freedom of
action and even lead to forcible bodily intrusions to protect the unborn child . . . Although
she is under no obligations to invite the fetus in or to allow it to remain, once she has done
these things she assumes obligations to the fetus that limit her freedom over her body.”).
266. A.C., 533 A.2d. at 615–16.
267. Id. at 616.
268. Id. at 614.
269. Id. at 617.
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significantly alter her prognosis, and her child had a chance of surviving,
the trial court “did not err in subordinating [the pregnant woman’s] right
against bodily intrusion to the interests of the unborn child and the
State.”270
Through this decision, the appellate court wholly embraced the
adversarial view of pregnancy in this non-abortion context. The court
reasoned that state action was needed because the mother’s refusal to
consent to a cesarean section prior to twenty-eight weeks conflicted with
the interest in potential life. Thus, the court applied the adversarial view of
pregnancy to justify balancing the State’s interest in protecting fetal life
against the mother’s interest in her bodily integrity. Importantly, the facts
in this case were easily distinguishable from the facts in an abortion case.
In an abortion case, a pregnant woman seeks to terminate her pregnancy.
Angela Carder was not seeking to terminate her pregnancy. Angela’s
family was seeking, simply, to be left in peace. They sought for Angela to
be permitted to live out her remaining days without state interference. She
refused a surgery that would hasten her death and remove her possibly
already brain dead, not yet fully developed child from her womb.271
Though some would argue that her refusal to consent placed her interests at
odds with the interests of her fetus, the claim is debatable. If Angela’s
child had survived, she would have had many serious health problems and
no mother.
Reasonable people could determine that, under the
circumstances, it would have been best to allow nature to run its course and
for Angela and her baby to pass on together. Despite the doctors’ opinions
that Angela’s life was coming to an end, it is also possible that Angela
would have continued to live long enough for her child to be delivered and
placed into her arms. Though we do not know why exactly, Angela, her
husband (the baby’s father), and her mother were all opposed to the earlier
cesarean section.272 Nevertheless, the State determined that, based on
Roe’s adversarial understanding and legal framework, it was proper to
forcibly remove Angela’s baby from her body.
A few months later, the Court of Appeals vacated its judgment denying
the stay and reheard the case, despite its apparent mootness, in order to
provide proper guidance if and when a similar case was to arise.273 After
fully considering the issues, the Court held that there was no legal basis for
forcing Angela to undergo a cesarean section without her consent even if
her refusal placed the fetus in harm’s way.274 The Court further determined
that where it was unclear whether a woman would consent to undergoing a
270. A.C., 533 A.2d. at 617.
271. Terry E. Thornton & Lynne Paltrow, The Rights of Pregnant Patients Carder Case
Brings Bold Policy Initiatives, 8(5) HEALTHSPAN 10 (1991), available at http://advocatesfor
pregnantwomen.org/articles/angela.htm.
272. Id.
273. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1237.
274. Id.
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cesarean section, as the hospital argued was the case for Angela Carder, it
was the court’s duty to make a finding through substituted judgment.275
Specifically, the Court held:
[I]n virtually all cases the question of what is to be done is to be
decided by the patient—the pregnant woman—on behalf of herself
and the fetus. If the patient is incompetent or otherwise unable to
give an informed consent to a proposed course of medical
treatment, then her decision must be ascertained through the
procedure known as substituted judgment.276
Moreover, the court found that since Angela neither consented to the
cesarean section, nor did the court make a finding of consent through
substituted judgment, “it was error for the trial court to proceed to a
balancing analysis, weighing the rights of [the mother] against the interests
of the state.”277
The appellate court rested its decision on the individual right to bodily
integrity.278 However, through its analysis of the case, the court rejected
the adversarial view of pregnancy embraced in the district court and initial
Court of Appeals decisions. The court did not consider Angela and her
fetus to be two separate beings in need of individualized legal protection.
The court did not view Angela as a threat to her pregnancy and an
adversary to her fetus. Rather, the court viewed the fetus as connected to
Angela and viewed Angela as the proper representative of her best interest,
her pregnancy included. By stating that “in virtually all cases the question
of what is to be done is to be decided by the patient—the pregnant
woman—on behalf of herself and the fetus” the court acknowledged that
the pregnant woman is the best judge of what is in the interest of herself,
her pregnancy, and her fetus.279
Thus, the trial court’s decision and the two decisions of the D.C.
Circuit in A.C. illustrate the disparate results of applying an adversarial or
connected view of pregnancy. Moreover, the decisions demonstrate that
courts are often confused about how to analyze state intervention with
pregnant women. Where the court embraced the adversarial view of
pregnancy, it authorized the State to interfere with the pregnant woman’s
decisions concerning her body, her life, and her unborn child. Where the
court embraced a connected view of pregnancy, it refused the State’s
275. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1237.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1248.
278. Id. at 1247 (“[T]he right of bodily integrity belongs equally to persons who are
competent and persons who are not. . . . To protect that right against intrusion by others—
family members, doctors, hospitals, or anyone else, however well-intentioned— . . . a court
must determine the patient’s wishes by any means available, and must abide by those wishes
unless there are truly extraordinary or compelling reasons to override them.”).
279. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1237.

Summer 2015]

HOLISTIC PREGNANCY

255

intrusion and concluded that the pregnant mother is the appropriate
representative of both her own interests and the interests of her unborn
child. Where the court analyzed the matter as an abortion case and as a
bodily integrity third party exception case, intervention was authorized.
Where the court analyzed the case as a bodily integrity patient consent
case, intervention was prohibited. The recent increase in forced medical
interventions of pregnant women demonstrates that, despite the corrective
action taken by the court of appeals in Angela Carder’s case, the
adversarial view of pregnancy is gaining support.280 Therefore, it is
especially important that courts apply a proper legal framework to analyze
cases of pregnant women.
Applying a holistic view of pregnancy and a presumption in favor of
maternal judgment to Angela Carder’s case, the court would have
acknowledged that pregnancy is a unique relational existential reality that
simultaneously represents duality and oneness and that, therefore, the State
should presume that Angela Carder is best positioned to determine how
best to handle her life and her pregnancy. Such a framework would support
the Circuit’s ultimate decision that the case should have been analyzed as a
matter of substitute judgment.
An Illinois court considered a similar issue four years later in In re
Baby Boy Doe.281 It considered whether a “court can balance whatever
rights a fetus may have against the rights of a competent woman to refuse
medical advice to obtain a cesarean section for the supposed benefit of the
fetus.”282 The court concluded that “no such balancing should be
employed, and that a woman’s competent choice to refuse medical
treatment as invasive as a cesarean section during a pregnancy must be
honored, even in circumstances where the choice may be harmful to her
fetus.” In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the 1988 Illinois
Supreme Court tort case Stallman v. Youngquist.283 In Stallman, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that a child could not bring suit against his mother for
damages sustained due to his mother’s unintentional infliction of prenatal
injuries.284 The Court reviewed the history of prenatal tort claims to reach
its conclusion. Without rejecting tort law that allows an infant to recover
for prenatal injuries against a third party, the court expressed is disapproval
of the adversarial view of pregnancy:
It would be a legal fiction to treat the fetus as a separate legal
person with rights hostile to and assertable against its mother. The
relationship between a pregnant woman and her fetus is unlike the
relationship between any other plaintiff and defendant. No other
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

See Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 6.
In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
Id. at 326.
Id. (citing Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988)).
Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 355.
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plaintiff depends exclusively on any other defendant for everything
necessary for life itself. No other defendant must go through
biological changes of the most profound type, possibly at the risk
of her own life, in order to bring forth an adversary into the world.
It is, after all, the whole life of the pregnant woman which impacts
on the development of the fetus. As opposed to the third-party
defendant, it is the mother’s every waking and sleeping moment
which, for better or worse, shapes the prenatal environment which
forms the world for the developing fetus. That this is so is not a
pregnant woman’s fault: it is a fact of life.285
In Baby Boy Doe, the court reached its ultimate conclusion based on
multiple legal principles.286 Most importantly, however, the court
considered the holding in Stallman and that court’s “recognition that the
relationship between a pregnant woman and a fetus is unique.”287 Despite
recognizing that the relationship between mother and fetus is “unlike the
relationship between any other plaintiff and defendant,”288 the court
recognized that under Illinois law, “a fetus is not treated only as part of its
mother.”289 However, it limited the fetal right to life to actions asserted
against third parties only—“not assertable against its mother . . . for the
unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries.”290
The A.C., Stallman, and Baby Boy Doe cases represent how a holistic
view of pregnancy can lead courts to defer to the pregnant woman’s
judgment. They illustrate the contrast between the adversarial view,
wherein fetal interests are assertable against the mother; the separate
existence view, wherein the fetus is an independent being that can assert its
interests against a third party not its mother; and the holistic view, wherein
the fetal-maternal relationship is characterized by simultaneous duality and
oneness. In embracing a holistic view, these cases focused on the “unique”
relationship shared by mother and fetus.291 They acknowledged that
mother and fetus are “unlike” other legal parties.292 Instead of trying to fit
the mother-fetus relationship into understandings of human relations
outside of the pregnancy and motherhood contexts, based on the
separateness of the individual, these cases attempt to recognize the true
nature of pregnancy and apply law to it in a reasonable and just manner.
285. Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
286. In reaching its decision, the court identified the common law right to refuse medical
treatment, the due process clause’s conferral of a “significant liberty interest in avoiding
unwanted medical procedures,” the state of Illinois’ acknowledgement that the state right of
privacy protects reproductive autonomy, and the right to religious liberty. In re Baby Boy
Doe, 632 N.E. 2d at 331.
287. Id. at 331.
288. Id. at 331–32.
289. Id. at 332 (emphasis added).
290. Id.
291. Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E. 2d at 331.
292. Id. at 331–32.
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In addition, these cases identify the practical problems with regulating
the mother-fetus relationship as if it was a relationship between two legal
strangers. They understand that it is a “fact of life” that the mother and
child are intertwined in unparalleled ways and that every action taken by
the pregnant mother “for better or worse, shapes the prenatal environment
which forms the world for the developing fetus.”293 Unlike the common
law courts’ adoption of the connected and separate existence views in the
earlier tort cases or the Supreme Court’s adoption of the adversarial view
and its rights balancing framework in the abortion cases, the Stallman court
adopted a holistic view of pregnancy after considering the actual nature of
pregnancy. The separate existence view was adopted primarily in an effort
to ensure a mechanism by which to right the wrong of prenatal injuries
caused by third parties. The adversarial view adopted by the Supreme
Court followed years of common law court application of the separate
existence view. It recognized that, regardless of the true nature of
pregnancy, in the special circumstances of abortion the woman and the
fetus have adversarial interests. A holistic view of pregnancy would
incorporate the view of the courts in A.C., Stallman, and Baby Boy Doe.
Interestingly, not all courts that have adopted a holistic view of
pregnancy have refused to balance the rights of the fetus against the
mother’s rights.294 In Raleigh Fitkin-Pal Morgan Memorial Hosp. v.
Anderson, a New Jersey court expressed support for a holistic view of
pregnancy, but, nevertheless, authorized violation of the mother’s bodily
integrity without her consent to save her life and the life of her child.295
The court expressed an understanding of pregnancy similar to the one
articulated by the Stallman Court: “the welfare of the child and mother are
so intertwined and inseparable that it would be impracticable to attempt to
distinguish between them.”296 However, the court concluded that “the
child’s right to live, even before birth, was superior to the mother’s right to
bodily inviolability.”297 Thus, despite the fact that the court adhered to a
connected view of pregnancy, it simultaneously recognized distinct rights
in the fetus, rights adversarial and superior to the mother’s rights.
The court’s reasoning in Raleigh Fitkin-Pal is flawed. If the pregnancy
represents inseparability and there is insufficient evidence to prove an
adversarial relationship between the mother and fetus, the court should
presume that the pregnant woman is best positioned to make decisions
concerning herself, her pregnancy, and her fetus. The conclusions reached

293. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, supra note 227, at 472.
294. See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964).
295. Id.; Case Comment, Transfusions Ordered for Dying Woman Over Religious
Objections, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 290, 293 (1964).
296. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp., 201 A.2d at 538.
297. Transfusions Ordered for Dying Woman Over Religious Objections, supra note 295,
at 293 (citing Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp., 201 A.2d at 537).
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in A.C, Stallman, and Baby Boy Doe are a more reasonable application of a
holistic view—that because of the “unique” relationship of the mother and
fetus, whereby the fetus depends exclusively on the mother for everything
necessary and where every act of the mother impacts “the environment
which forms the world for the developing fetus,” it is inappropriate to
balance fetal rights against maternal rights.298 Though A.C. and Baby Boy
Doe were medical intervention cases that adopted a holistic view of
pregnancy and deferred to the pregnant woman’s judgment in making
medical decisions concerning her pregnancy, the more recent trend has
been to adopt an adversarial view of pregnancy and allow the State to
violate the pregnant woman’s bodily integrity in the interest of fetal life.
The adoption of a holistic view of pregnancy coupled with a presumption
in favor of maternal decision making would preclude the State from second
guessing pregnant women’s healthcare decisions.
Importantly, though both the A.C. and Baby Boy Doe courts refused to
allow the state to intervene without the pregnant woman’s consent, each
court employed a distinct reasoning. Moreover, though A.C. ultimately
reached the same conclusion as it would have pursuant to a holistic view of
pregnancy, the court’s application of a simple bodily integrity/patient
consent framework failed to recognize that pregnancy is a unique reality
that requires special legal consideration. In contrast, Baby Boy Doe,
consistent with my proposed approach, did acknowledge the uniqueness of
pregnancy in determining that the state could not interfere with the
pregnant woman’s refusal of a cesarean section. Though the court relied on
the right to bodily integrity in prohibiting state interference, like the court
in A.C., Baby Boy Doe’s reasoning was based on the unique nature of
pregnancy as discussed in Stallman.
A recent article authored by Lynn Paltrow and Jeanne Flavin critiquing
state interventions in pregnancies tracked “forced interventions on pregnant
women” from 1973–2005.299 One example discussed in the article was the
case of Laura Pemberton, a pregnant woman who was forcibly restrained
while in active labor and compelled to undergo a cesarean section because
doctors believed “she was posing a risk to the life of her unborn child by
attempting to have a vaginal birth after having had a previous cesarean
section (VBAC).”300 Subsequently, she filed suit against the hospital as
agents of the State for violation of her substantive and procedural due
298. Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E. 2d at 331; Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, supra note 227, at 472.
299. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 6.
300. Id. at 306–07; Sarah D. Murphy, note, Labor Pains in Feminist Jurisprudence: An
Examination of Birthing Rights, 8 AVE MARIA L. REV. 443, 461–63 (2010) (discussing that
though a VBAC poses a risk to both mother and fetus, the risk of posed by cesarean sections
are similar and that the preference for cesarean sections among medical professionals is
really based on medical interests in better hours and avoidance of malpractice lawsuits, not
fetal protection).
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process rights to, among other things, bodily integrity.301 In granting the
hospital’s motion for summary judgment, the district court relied on Roe’s
rights-balancing framework under which “by the point of viability . . . the
state’s interest in preserving the life of the fetus outweighs the mother’s
own constitutional interest in determining whether she will bear a child.”302
It determined that “Ms. Pemberton’s personal constitutional rights . . .
clearly did not outweigh the interests of the State of Florida in preserving
the life of the unborn child.”303 The court held that the facts at issue were
actually more supportive of state intervention than in Roe because:
[T]he full-term baby’s birth was imminent, and more importantly . . .
the mother sought only to avoid a particular procedure for giving
birth, not to avoid giving birth altogether. Bearing an unwanted
child is surely a greater intrusion on the mother’s constitutional
interests than undergoing a caesarean section to deliver a child that
the mother affirmatively desires to deliver. Thus the State’s interest
here was greater, and the mother’s interest less, than during the third
trimester situation addressed in Roe.304
The court did not recognize that the case was factually distinguishable
from Roe.305 Laura Pemberton, unlike a pregnant woman seeking to
terminate her pregnancy, showed absolutely no evidence of an adversarial
mother-fetus relationship.306 Instead of applying the Roe framework, the
court should have, based on the facts, adopted a holistic conceptualization
of Laura’s pregnancy and recognized, like the courts in A.C. and Baby Boy
Doe, that the pregnant woman’s interests were aligned with her unborn
child’s interest and that her bodily integrity was not subject to state
intervention. This misapplication of the adversarial conceptualization of
pregnancy is not isolated.307 Criminal and dependency courts apply an
301. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1251
(N.D. Fla. 1999).
302. Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1251.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1251–52.
305. Murphy, supra note 300, at 465–67 (critiquing application of Roe to Pemberton by
arguing that under Roe the state’s power is prohibitive and in Pemberton the state took
“assertive measure against a woman’s decision by forcing her to undergo a cesarean
section” against her will).
306. Laura Pemberton “left the state and went on to have four more children, including a
set of twins, vaginally.” Writing Contest to Advance Feminist Legal Scholarship on the
Subject of Pregnant Women’s Civil and Human Rights, Aug. 28, 2008, http://advocatesfor
pregnantwomen.org/main/events/writing_contest_to_advance_feminist_legal_scholarship_o
n_the_subject_of_pregnant_womens_civil_and_human_rights.php.
307. Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Op-Ed., Pregnant, and No Civil Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2014, at A21; For a discussion of how the Supreme Court’s decision in
Carhart impacts pregnant women’s medical intervention cases see Margo Kaplan, “A
Special Class of Persons”: Pregnant Women’s Right to Refuse Medical Treatment After
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adversarial view of pregnancy to incarcerate pregnant women and mothers
and to deny them their parental rights.
B. CRIMINAL AND DEPENDENCY LAW
Application of the adversarial conceptualization of pregnancy has led to
especially devastating results for some mothers in the dependency and criminal
contexts.308 State child welfare laws establish that mothers who engage in
certain conduct during their pregnancy may face the loss of their maternal
rights.309 A woman whose legal motherhood would otherwise be recognized at
law may be barred from establishing legal motherhood exclusively on the basis
of her actions during the pregnancy.310 Even where the State does not
terminate the mother’s legal status, her access to her child may be limited or
denied.311 Additionally, a mother’s conduct during her pregnancy may result
in her criminal prosecution and incarceration.312 Recent commentators have
Gonzales v. Carhart, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 145, 145 (2010) (“Until Carhart, abortion
jurisprudence provided very limited support for compelled medical treatment of pregnant
women more generally. Carhart interprets the state interests in fetal life and maternal
health so broadly that it essentially creates new, dubious state interests that, in the context of
compelled treatment cases, expand state justifications for requiring medical treatment of
pregnant women, even where such treatment would harm women’s health.”).
308. See e.g. Ex parte Ankrom, 1110176 & 1110219, 2013 WL 9828405 (Ala. Jan. 11,
2013) (affirming ten-year sentence for mother of two who was convicted under child
endangerment statute based on her prenatal drug use, and affirming three year sentence for
mother of three convicted of child endangerment based on prenatal drug use where her baby
was born healthy); Bei Bei Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming
indictment of woman charged with murder and attempted feticide based on attempted
suicide while pregnant); State v. Buckhalter, 119 So. 3d 1015 (Miss. 2013) (mother charged
with culpable-negligence manslaughter after she gave birth to a stillborn baby); Order
162566, Gibbs v. State, No. 2010-IA-00819-SCT (Miss. Oct. 27, 2011) (teenaged mother
charged with depraved heart-murder after she gave birth to stillborn baby); In re Roni M.H.,
No. E2011–02691–COA–R3–PT, 2012 WL 1523948, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 30, 2012)
(mother’s parental rights terminated based on prenatal drug use).
309. Ian Vandewalker, Comment, Taking the Baby Before It’s Born: Termination of the
Parental Rights of Women Who use Illegal Drugs While Pregnant, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 423 (2008); In re Unborn Child, 683 N.Y.S.2d 366, 369 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1998)
(determining that a mother was guilty of derivative neglect of her unborn child where she
admitted to using illegal drugs during her pregnancy in violation of a court order that she
refrain from drug use).
310. Vandewalker, supra note 309.
311. See Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 9828405.
312. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 6; Karen McVeigh, Study Finds Widespread
‘Criminalisation of Pregnancy’ in U.S. Institutions, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 14, 2013), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/15/criminalisation-pregnancy-women-study; State v.
McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003) (convicting the defendant of homicide by child
abuse where she gave birth to a full-term stillborn child as a result of using cocaine while
pregnant); Ex parte Hicks, 153 So. 3d 53 (Ala. 2014) (holding that the defendant was
properly convicted of chemical endangerment of a child for exposing her unborn child to
cocaine while pregnant); Radley Balko, And Now: The Criminalization of Parenthood,
WASH. POST, Jul. 14, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/07/
14/and-now-the-criminalization-of-parenthood/ (noting that Tennessee native, Mallory
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identified this trend of incarcerating pregnant women as the “criminalization of
pregnancy.”313
In 2012, in In re Roni M.H., a Tennessee Appellate Court articulated its
view of prenatal conduct that justifies terminating a mother’s parental
rights. The court explained:
We have repeatedly held that probation violations, repeated
incarceration, criminal behavior, substance abuse, and the failure to
provide adequate support or supervision for a child can, alone or in
combination, constitute conduct that exhibits a wanton disregard
for the welfare of a child.314
Pursuant to Tennessee statute, a finding that a mother has engaged in
conduct that “exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child” is
grounds for terminating her parental rights.315 The Appellate Court
sustained termination of the mother’s parental rights on the basis of
“wanton disregard for the welfare of the child,” where the finding was
based on “evidence of her drug abuse in the course of her pregnancy with

Loyola, was charged with felony assault after her newborn infant tested positive for
methamphetamine as a result of her prenatal drug use).
313. See McVeigh, supra note 312; Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 6. A review of the legal
response to ‘crack babies’ in the 1980s reveals that this trend is not at all new. See Louise
Marlane Chan, Note, S.O.S. from the Womb: A Call for New York Legislation Criminalizing
Drug Use During Pregnancy, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 199 (1993) (arguing in favor of
criminal legislation proscribing drug use during pregnancy); Michael T. Flannery, CourtOrdered Prenatal Intervention: A Final Means to the End of Gestational Substance Abuse,
30 J. FAM. L. 519 (1991) (arguing for prenatal intervention to address the epidemic of
prenatal drug use and its impact on newborns); Lynn Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal
Persons, and the Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 ALB. L. REV. 999 (1999) (discussing
prosecutions of pregnant women as a threat to reproductive freedom); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of
Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991) (adding the perspective of poor Black women to
the debate over protecting fetal rights by prosecuting women for drug use during pregnancy
and arguing that such prosecutions violate women’s fundamental rights).
314. In re Roni M.H., No. E2011–02691–COA–R3–PT, 2012 WL 1523948, at *9 (Tenn.
Ct. App. April 30, 2012) (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 867–868 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2005)). However, the results of a recent twenty-five year study on the “crack baby”
epidemic of the 1980s revealed that there are no statistically significant differences in the
long-term health or brain development of children that were exposed to cocaine in utero
compared to those who were not. Katie McDonough, Long-term Study Debunks Myth of the
“Crack Baby”, SALON, Jul. 23, 2013, http://www.salon.com/2013/07/23/longterm_study
_debunks_myth_of_the_crack_baby/. As Dr. Deborah A. Frank, a pediatrician, related, the
“crack baby” epidemic was more of a moral issue rather than an actual health problem, as
society’s reaction to prenatal drug use was “‘guided not by the toxicity, but by the social
meaning’ of the drug.” Susan Okie, The Epidemic that Wasn’t, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/health/27coca.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Notably,
researchers working on the study found that factors like poor parenting, poverty, and stress
were more likely to damage a child’s intellectual and emotional development than prenatal
drug exposure. Id.
315. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (West 2010).
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the Child.”316 Thus, under Tennessee law, a mother’s parental rights are
subject to termination based solely on her conduct during pregnancy.317
This case is but one example of the common sentiment that regardless
of a woman’s intent, conduct that may harm the fetus during pregnancy is
wrong and should be punished. Sometimes the punishment takes the form
of forcibly separating the mother and child and denying the mother access
or rights to her child, under the guise of child welfare. Other times,
especially in cases where there was a miscarriage, stillborn baby, or death
of the infant soon after delivery, the punishment takes the form of
removing the mother’s other children from her and/or prosecuting her
under criminal law. Even worse, a mother may face prison time even
where it is unclear whether the conduct caused the prenatal injury. The
next two cases are illustrative of the trend to conceptualize all pregnancies
as inherently adversarial and the consequences of such a conceptualization.
On April 29, 2008, Amanda Helaine Borden Kimbrough went into
premature labor.318 Amanda and her husband, Timmy Sr., were looking
forward to welcoming their third child.319 Doctors told the Kimbroughs at
a prenatal visit in early April that Timmy Jr. would have Down syndrome
and counseled them about the option to terminate the pregnancy, but they
declined that option and remained eager to welcome their first son into
their family.320 The Kimbroughs refused to consider abortion because they
were morally opposed to it.321 Due to many factors, including prematurity
and a prolapsed cord, Timmy Jr.’s birth was complicated and he died only
nineteen minutes after he was born.322 While at the hospital, Kimbrough’s
obstetrician ordered a urine drug screen, which came back positive for
methamphetamine.323 The pediatrician who treated Timmy Jr. determined
that he died due to “respiratory arrest secondary to prematurity.”324
However, the medical examiner who performed Timmy Jr.’s autopsy found
that he died from “acute methamphetamine intoxication.”325
As a consequence, Kimbrough’s other two children were removed from
her custody.326 For ninety days she was permitted only supervised visits
with them.327 In July, following a determination that the children would be
316. In re Roni M.H., 2012 WL 1523948 *1, *8 (Ct. App. Tenn. 2012).
317. Id.
318. Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 9828405 at *3.
319. Ada Calhoun, The Criminalization of Bad Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/magazine/the-criminalization-of-bad-mothers.html?pagewan
ted=all&_r=0.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 9838405 at *3.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at *4.
327. Calhoun, supra note 5.
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safe in her care, the State returned Kimbrough’s children to her.328 Six
months after Timmy Jr.’s death, the County District Attorney’s office
charged Kimbrough with chemical endangerment of a child, resulting in
death, which carried a mandatory sentence of 10 years to life.329 After a
two-day trial, Kimbrough pleaded guilty on the advice of counsel and was
sentenced to 10 years in prison.330
On January 31, 2009, Hope Elisabeth Ankrom gave birth to a healthy
son she named Bryson.331 Bryson was Ankrom’s third child; she already
had two daughters, Aubree, aged 1, and Paige, aged 2. During her
pregnancy, Ankrom tested positive for both marijuana and cocaine.332
Though she denied ever using cocaine, Ankrom admitted that she used
marijuana during her pregnancy because “her morning sickness was
relentless.”333 At birth, Bryson tested positive for cocaine.334 The hospital
reported the drug test results to the State and Ankrom’s children were taken
from her care.335 On February 18, 2009, the police arrested Ankrom from
her home.336 Because she was still breastfeeding, the officers permitted her
to “pump a few times before they took [her] to jail.”337 On April 1, 2010,
Ankrom was sentenced to three years in prison for violating Alabama’s
chemical endangerment of a child statute.338
Both Ankrom and Kimbrough appealed their convictions claiming that
the term “child” in the Alabama statute did not include a fetus.339 In 2011, in
a case of first impression, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals upheld
Ankrom’s conviction for ingesting a controlled substance during her
pregnancy and her child’s positive test for the controlled substance at birth.340
In 2013, the Supreme Court of Alabama consolidated Ankrom’s and
Kimbrough’s appeals to determine “[w]hether the term ‘child’ . . . includes
an unborn child.”341 Ultimately, the court upheld both convictions.342 The
court relied on public policy, the plain meaning of the word “child,” the
persuasive reasoning of a South Carolina Supreme Court decision in a
328. Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 9838405 at *4.
329. Calhoun, supra note 5.
330. Id.
331. Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 9828405 at *1; Calhoun, supra note 5.
332. Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 9828405 at *22.
333. Id. at *1; Calhoun, supra note 5.
334. Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 9828405 at *1; Calhoun, supra note 5.
335. Calhoun, supra note 5; see Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001)
(determining that South Carolina state hospital’s reporting of pregnant women’s medical
results to law enforcement was an unreasonable search and seizure that violated pregnant
women’s constitutional rights).
336. Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 9828405 at *1; Calhoun, supra note 5.
337. Calhoun, supra note 5.
338. Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 9828405 at *2.
339. Id. at *1.
340. Ankrom v. State, 152 So.3d at 377 (Ala. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2011).
341. Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 9828405 at *1.
342. Id. at *7.
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similar case, and the State’s interest in protecting the life of the fetus.343
The court held that Alabama’s chemical endangerment statute applied to
mothers who “caused their unborn child to ingest a controlled
substance.”344 This decision placed Alabama in the minority position, since
“a majority of jurisdictions have held that unborn children are not afforded
protection from the use of a controlled substance by their mothers.”345
Despite being the minority position, the decision of the Alabama
Supreme Court in Ankrom is representative of a trend toward the
criminalization of pregnancy. In Alabama alone, since 2006 approximately
60 new mothers have been prosecuted under the child-endangerment
statute.346 These cases represent an abrupt departure from the common law
view that a mother should not be liable to her child for prenatal injuries.
Today, women are facing imprisonment for prenatal injuries.
The cases of Ankrom and Kimbrough are representative of how
application of an adversarial view of pregnancy can lead to devastating
results for families. Both mothers were separated from their children and
incarcerated as punishment for their misconduct during pregnancy. The
fact that neither intended to harm their unborn children was not considered
by the court. The lack of certainty with regard to whether Kimbrough’s
child died due to her alleged drug use was also left unconsidered. The
reality that Ankrom birthed a healthy baby, a healthy baby in need of his
mother, was also disregarded by the court when it affirmed the decision to
remove Ankrom from her nursing infant and imprison her. These extreme
results are the logical consequence of presuming the maternal-fetal
relationship to be adversarial.
Application of a holistic view of pregnancy would require courts to
acknowledge the connected and symbiotic nature of the maternal-fetal
relationship and the many ways in which the pregnant woman cares,
nurtures, and protects her fetus. Applying a holistic view of pregnancy to
Kimbrough’s and Ankrom’s pregnancies would have prompted the court to
consider their whole pregnancies. Application of a holistic view of
pregnancy would necessitate consideration of the pregnant woman’s social
relationship with her fetus as often evinced by her intention. Where, as
here, the parties’ intent clearly indicates a nonadversarial maternal-fetal
relationship, there would be no basis for viewing the pregnancy through an
adversarial lens. Kimbrough and Ankrom would have been entitled to a
presumption in favor of their maternal decision making during their
pregnancies. The State would not have been able to criminalize their
conduct absent overcoming the maternal presumption.347
343. Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 9828405 at *18.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Calhoun, supra note 5.
347. In a subsequent paper I will discuss how the State can overcome the presumption in
favor of maternal decision making during pregnancy.
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The Indiana case of Bei Bei Shuai is an example of the criminal
prosecution of a woman after her suicide attempt. Shuai was pregnant
through an affair with Zhiliang Guan, a married man.348 Upon being left by
Guan she became distraught and suicidal.349 Shuai purchased rat poison
with the intention of committing suicide and taking her “baby” with her.350
She was 33 weeks pregnant at the time.351 Later that day, a friend brought
Shuai to the hospital.352 After she and the fetus were stabilized, Shuai was
given a steroid to “improve post-birth lung functioning of children who are
born prematurely.”353 Immediately thereafter, Shuai began having
contractions.354 She was given indomethacin “to stop the contractions.”355
One week later, a doctor observed “an unusual fetal heart rate.”356 With
Shuai’s consent, the doctors performed a cesarean section to deliver the
baby immediately.357 The infant was transferred to the neonatal intensive
care unit.358 Shuai’s baby, Angel, had a “high International Normalized
Ratio,” indicating her blood would not clot and a “bilateral Grade III
intraventricular hemorrhage” from which she was unable to recover.359
Three days after her birth, Angel was removed from life support and
died.360 There was conflicting evidence as to whether Angel’s death was
the result of the rat poison ingested by Shuai, inherited hemophilia,
disseminated intravascular coagulation, or some unknown cause.361
The appellate court denied Shuai’s motion to dismiss that argued, in
part, that the homicide and feticide statutes pursuant to which Shuai was
charged did not apply to a pregnant woman and the fetus she carries.362
Specifically, Shuai argued that “the relationship between a mother and the
fetus she carries is unique and ‘fundamentally and profoundly different
from third-party attacks on pregnant women.’”363 Shuai relied on a 2000

348. Bei Bei Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
349. Id.
350. Id. Shuai “wrote Guan, saying she felt she and the fetus were a burden on Guan, she
had resolved to kill herself, and she was ‘taking this baby, the one you named Crystal, with
[her].’ Shuai then ingested rat poison. Shuai called Guan and told him she had ingested rat
poison and was going to die.” Id. (alteration in original).
351. Id.
352. Id.; see also Diana Penner, Woman Freed After Plea Agreement in Baby’s Death,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 2, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/08/02/
woman-freed-after-plea-agreement-in-babys-death/2614301/.
353. Bei Bei Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 622.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Bei Bei Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 622.
360. Id. at 623.
361. Id. at 624.
362. Id. at 626.
363. Id. at 628.
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Indiana Court of Appeals case holding that an unborn child was not a
“dependent” under the State neglect statute and that, therefore, the mother
could not be charged with neglect based on her ingestion of cocaine while
pregnant.364 However, the court refused to adopt Shuai’s reasoning and
instead distinguished the cases based on statutory interpretation.365
Judge Patricia Riley of the Indiana Court of Appeals wrote a separate
opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part in the Bei Bei Shuai
decision. Riley argued against the majority’s interpretation of the feticide
statute. She argued that the Court’s reading would lead to “absurd”
results.366 Riley argued that if interpreted according to the State, Indiana’s
feticide statute could “create an indefinite number of new ‘crimes.’”367 She
suggested that such a reading of the statute could criminalize pregnant
women’s use of “over-the-counter cold remedies,” “sleep aids,” cigarettes,
and alcohol.368 Riley warned that the majority’s decision could have
unintended consequences: “the State’s interpretation might lead to a
slippery slope whereby the feticide statute could be construed as covering a
full range of a pregnant woman's behavior.”369
Riley’s dissent did not include any discussion of the legal
conceptualization of pregnancy or the theoretical foundations for such
conceptualizations.
Rather, it focused on the practical impact of
adjudicating pregnancy like any other relationship between two strangers.
Her argument demonstrates how an adversarial view of the mother-fetus
relationship can be the foundation for absurd results. By allowing criminal
charges to be pursued against a pregnant woman for her attempted suicide,
the court opens the door to criminal prosecutions anytime a pregnant
woman’s actions are harmful to her fetus. This view discounts the care that
a pregnant woman provides to her fetus. It disregards the biological fact
that, were it not for the pregnant woman, there would be no fetus. A
narrow view of pregnancy that holds a pregnant woman accountable to the
State for misconduct during pregnancy without taking into account the
reality of the mother-fetus connection and the history of the woman’s propregnancy conduct does not reflect the overall nature of pregnancy.
Denying mothers their parental rights or incarcerating them on the
basis of their conduct during pregnancy is inconsistent with a holistic view
of pregnancy and a presumption in favor of the pregnant woman’s
364. Bei Bei Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 628 (citing Herron v. State, 729 N.E.2d 1008, 1011 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2000)).
365. Bei Bei Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 629. After the Court remanded the case, Shuai pled
guilty and was sentenced to time served, which was a total of 178 days. Bei Bei Shuai
Pleads Guilty in Baby’s Death, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 2, 2013, 7:44 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/02/bei-bei-shuai-guilty_n_3698383.html.
366. Bei Bei Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 636.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
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decisions. Under a holistic view of pregnancy, courts would be unable to
dissect the maternal-fetal relationship so as to selectively penalize
undesirable aspects of the relationship. Under a holistic view of the
pregnancy, courts would need to recognize that, but for the pregnant
woman, there would be no baby and that, therefore, it is inappropriate to
punish the pregnant woman for her conduct, even where that conduct may
compromise the health of the pregnant woman, the pregnancy, or the fetus.
Where pregnant women make poor choices due to addiction or mental
illness, it is inappropriate to disregard the holistic nature of the maternalfetal relationship and characterize the pregnancy as adversarial.
Theoretically, punishing pregnant women for misconduct is unreasonable.
From a physiological perspective, punishing women for misconduct during
pregnancy fails to account for the many acts of connection, protection, and
care that the woman’s body has provided to the fetus. From a social
perspective, punishing women for misconduct during pregnancy fails to
acknowledge and value the social choice they made to carry their
pregnancies to term and welcome a child into the world. An unintended
consequence of the State’s punishment of pregnant women may be to
actually encourage women to have abortions.370 Thus, a holistic view of
pregnancy and a presumption in favor of maternal decision making can
have clear benefits for the pregnant woman and the fetus.

IV. CONCLUSION
The legal conceptualization of pregnancy has been developing since
the 1800s. Today, the law often views pregnancy as having an inherently
adversarial nature. It regards pregnancy as the embodiment of two separate
beings, a mother and a fetus, with adversarial interests. This adversarial
view is the result of an over one hundred-year evolution of the law. In the
late 1800s, the law saw the fetus, simply, as a part of the mother. This
connected view of pregnancy understood the mother and fetus as one.
During the early 1900s, the legal construction of pregnancy shifted
away from the connected view. The law adopted an understanding of
pregnancy as the embodiment of two separately existing beings, a mother
and a fetus. Pursuant to the separate existence view, a child could bring
suit against a third party for actions which caused the child’s prenatal
injuries. Though the law regarded the fetus as separate from the mother, it

370. Marina Greywind, a North Dakota woman, obtained an abortion to avoid criminal
prosecution after she was charged with child endangerment for inhaling paint fumes while
pregnant. Gina Kolata, Woman in Abortion Dispute Ends Her Pregnancy, Feb. 26, 1992,
N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/26/us/woman-in-abortion-dispute-ends-herpregnancy.html; NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER, FACT SHEET: IF YOU REALLY CARE
ABOUT CRIMINAL JUSTICE, YOU SHOULD CARE ABOUT REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE! (Oct. 2014),
available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/criminal_justice_reproductive_
justice_ factsheet_10-3-14.pdf.

268

HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26:2

did not view the mother and fetus as adversaries. The law therefore refused
to allow the child to bring suit against the mother for injuries sustained by
the fetus during the pregnancy. This view of pregnancy remains prevalent
in tort law today.
The Supreme Court’s consideration of pregnancy during the abortion
cases led to the modification of the separate existence view into an
adversarial view of pregnancy that regards the mother and fetus as separate
and adversarial beings. While this conceptualization of the maternal-fetal
relationship is understandable in the abortion context, it is theoretically
inconsistent with wanted pregnancies. Nevertheless, increasingly, courts
are applying the adversarial view of pregnancy to analyze wanted
pregnancies in cases concerning medical intervention, criminal prosecution,
and dependency proceedings. As a result, pregnant women are being
assaulted, incarcerated, and separated from their children by the State.
I propose reconceptualizing the legal view of pregnancy for all wanted
pregnancies to reflect a holistic understanding of the maternal-fetal
relationship. This holistic view of pregnancy would incorporate
interdisciplinary maternal research recognizing that pregnancy is a unique
relational existential reality that simultaneously represents duality and
oneness. This view incorporates both the connected and separate aspects of
pregnancy. Building upon this foundation, I propose the adoption of a
legal presumption in favor of maternal decision making during pregnancy.
The consequence of adopting a holistic conceptualization of pregnancy
and a presumption in favor of maternal decision making during pregnancy
in the healthcare and misconduct contexts would be the preclusion of State
interference with pregnant women’s medical decisions. In the healthcare
context, the pregnant woman’s choice of a particular birthing plan or
prenatal care would be protected from State veto. Understanding pregnancy
from a holistic perspective necessitates recognizing that the pregnant
woman, alone, provides the connection, protection, and care critical to fetal
life. A holistic perspective recognizes that there would be no pregnancy
but for the pregnant woman, that the pregnant woman alone sustains fetal
life, and, therefore, it is inappropriate for the State to overrule her
healthcare decisions. Pursuant to a holistic view, the State recognizes that
the pregnant woman, the one person who is making significant individual
sacrifice to welcome a new life into the world and who is most likely to be
the person who will make the most significant sacrifices in raising her
future child, is best situated to determine what is in the best interest of
herself, her pregnancy, and her fetus. Therefore, a holistic view of
pregnancy supports a presumption that the pregnant woman’s medical
decisions are in the best interest of the woman, her pregnancy, and her
fetus.
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In the context of maternal misconduct during pregnancy, the State
would be generally precluded from taking action to punish the woman or
deny her parental rights where, but for the pregnancy, there would be no
basis for State action. In this case, the State’s deference to maternal
decision making would acknowledge that it is in the best interest of the
pregnant woman, the pregnancy, and the fetus to abstain from incarcerating
pregnant women or separating them from their children. By adopting a
holistic view of pregnancy, the State recognizes that the pregnant woman’s
interests are aligned with the fetus and that pregnant women who intend to
carry their pregnancies to term and birth a child should not be subjected to
an increased likelihood of incarceration or familial separation. While the
State would be free to offer support to a pregnant woman dealing with
addiction or mental health issues, it would remain barred from prosecuting
her or initiating dependency proceedings against her where such action
would be otherwise unavailable were she not pregnant.371
In conclusion, the adversarial conceptualization of pregnancy that was
developed in the abortion context has no place in the case of wanted
pregnancies. Rather, a holistic conceptualization of pregnancy, pregnancy
as a unique relational existential reality that simultaneously represents
duality and oneness, should be adopted. This view of pregnancy, based on
scientific knowledge and maternal experience, presumes that the pregnant
woman acts in the best interest of herself, her pregnancy, and her fetus.
Where pregnant women have chosen to carry a pregnancy to term,
therefore, the State should defer to their choices and conduct during
pregnancy. Pregnant women should not be subject to heightened scrutiny
and the State should not use pregnancy to justify interfering with women’s
autonomy, bodily integrity, parental rights, and physical freedom.

371. In a subsequent paper I will discuss the circumstances under which the State can
overcome a presumption in favor of maternal decision making during pregnancy.
Additionally, I will consider whether State intervention in the form of social services is
more likely to serve State interests in maternal health and potential life than criminal and
dependency actions.
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